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TOORWOORD 
Het onderzoek dat gerapporteerd wordt in d i t proefschrift, werd 
mogelijk gemaakt door een subsidie van de Nederlandse Organisatie voor 
Zuiver-Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek. Dit proefschrift i s tevens het 
eindverslag van d i t ZWO-projekt (nr. 56-103) dat was get i te ld: 'De 
ontwikkeling van herkenning van emoties'. 
Graag zou ik eenieder willen bedanken die aan het to t stand komen van 
dit proefschrift heeft bijgedragen. In de eerste plaats zijn d i t de 
kinderen en de studenten die bereidwillig deelnamen aan de 3 experi­
mentele studies. Ook genoemd moeten worden de akteurs die hun 
onontbeerlijke medewerking verleenden aan de video-opnamen voor het 
stlmulusmateriaal van de 3 studies. Zeker vermeld dienen te worden 
a l l e medewerkers en ex-medewerkers van de audiovisuele diensten van de 
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (A-faculteiten) en van de Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam die meegewerkt hebben aan de vervaardiging van 
d i t stimulusmateriaal. Alleen dankzij hun enthousiaane en inzet konden 
de vele tegenslagen ti jdens de video-opnemen en -montages о ачгаппеп 
worden. Verder wil ik Henk Willems noanen die in het kader van zijn 
doktoraal-skriptie het onderzoek dat beschreven wordt in studie 3. 
uitvoerde. Bovendien deed hi j samen met Michael Molleman de zeer 
tijdrovende FACS-koderingen van de gezichtsexpressies in a l l e 3 de 
studies. Ook dien ik Paul ten Brink en Monique Geertzen te vermelden 
die een deel van de koderingen en analyses in studie 2 verrichtten. 
Michael Katzko zorgde voor de correcties op het Engels. Niet in de 
laats te plaats zou ik willen noemen a l l e medewerkers en ex-medewerkers 
van de Vakgroep Ontwikkelingspsychologie van de Katholieke Universi­
t e i t Nijmegen die op enigerlei wijze betrokken zijn geweest b i j het 
onderzoek. 
"Show some emotion 
put expression in your eyes-
light up 
if you're feeling happy 
but i f it's bad 
then let those tears roll down" 
Joan Avmatrading 
The research reported in this thesis was supported by a grant (56-103) 
from the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research 
(ZWO). 
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SUMMARY 
The present research is concerned with emotion recognition in chil-
dren and adults. Einotion recognition is defined as the process by 
which a person (the observer) comes to know how another person (the 
actor) feels. 
In chapter I, we discuss the emotion recognition process from a 
theoretical perspective. Theories of emotion agree upon four basic 
components of emotion, i.e., the cognitive, expressive, physiological, 
and subjective component of emotion. A theoretical model is proposed 
in which all four components of the actor's emotion may contribute to 
the observer's emotion recognition. In this model, the four components 
of the actor's emotion are externalized via distal cœs, i.e., situa-
tional, expressive, physiological, and affective cues. These distal 
cues are proximally represented in the observer via perceptual 
processes in proximal percepts. These proximal percepts may then 
activate three cognitive/affective inference processes: nonempathic 
inference, inferential empathy, and noninferential empathy. These 
processes may result in four possible responses reflecting emotion 
recognition, i.e., cognitive understanding, and expressive, physiolog-
ical, and affective matching. 
Next, we discuss several earlier views on emotion recognition, 
i.e., Scherer's Brunswikian lens model, the dimensional and categori-
cal approach, Flavell's view, Borke's cognitive empathy, Feshbach's 
affective empathy, motor mimicry and afferent feedback, and 
egocentriam-nonegocentrism and centration-decentration. It is shown 
that all discussed views can be accomodated in the proposed model of 
emotion recognition. In agreement with these views, two sets of 
distal cues are considered to be of major importance for emotion 
recognition, i.e., situational and expressive cues. We conducted 
three studies dealing with three issues concerning the role of situa-
tional and expressive cues in emotion recognition. 
In Chapter II, we present study 1 which focused on the issue of 
specifying correspondences between facial expressive distal cues and 
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observers' cognitive understanding of expressed emotions. Thirty-nine 
adult observers had to rate videotaped facial expressions predicted to 
be expressions of happiness, fear, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, 
shame, and contanpt. Predictions were based on the facial action units 
involved in the videotaped expressions as described with Hcraan and 
Friesen's Facial Action Coding System (FACS). The results indicated 
that observers' ratings of emotions agreed with FACS-based predictions 
regarding the facial action units involved in expressing each of the 
emotions. In addition, observers' ratings of intensity of emotion 
reflected a reliance on only one or tvro action units for each emotion. 
In Chapter III, we present study 2 in which we assessed children's 
reliance on situational and facial expressive distal cues in recogniz-
ing emotions at various ages. The facial expressive cues for this 
study were selected using the results of study 1. Ninety-six girls 
between 4 and 8 years of age were presented with videotaped episodes 
in which actors portrayed emotions. When situational and expressive 
cues were nondiscrepant, girls were better at all age levels in recog-
nizing happiness, fear, sadness, anger, and disgust than shame and 
contempt. This result was interpreted as reflecting differences in 
complexity of emotions. When situational and expressive cues were 
discrepant, girls preferred cues depicting the most recognizable emo-
tion, regardless of the type of cue. That is, they relied on cues dep-
icting a simple emotion in preference to cues depicting a complex emo-
tion, and on emotional cues in preference to neutral cues. Contrary to 
our expectations, there was no stronger reliance on more salient cues 
in preference to less salient cues. Girls' responses to questions 
regarding the perceived cues reflected a developmental trend from not-
icing only one type of cue to considering both types. This result was 
interpreted as reflecting a development from centration to decentra-
tion. 
In Chapter IV, we present study 3 in which we assessed whether 
children's emotion recognition from situational and facial expressive 
cues reflected nonempathic inference, inferential empathy, or 
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noninferential empathy. In this study, 48 5-year-old girls were shown 
videotaped episodes in which actors portrayed happiness, fear, sad-
ness, or anger. The episodes involved fart of the nondiscrepant cues 
of study 2. Three emotion recognition responses were measured: cogni-
tive empathy (girls' cognitive understanding of the actor's emotion), 
affective empathy (girls' responses reflecting affective matching with 
the actor's emotion), and facial empathy (girls' responses reflecting 
facial expressive matching as measured with Ekman and Friesen's FACS). 
From the interdependency of the three empathie responses, it was con-
cluded that affective and facial empathy were mediated by cognitive 
empathy. Furthermore, cognitive empathy nor affective empathy appeared 
to be aroused by involuntary facial empathy. In other words, most 
girls' emotion recognitions reflected nonempathic inference. Only some 
of their emotion recognitions reflected inferential empathy, whereas 
no evidence for noninferential empathy was found. 
In Chapter V, the findings of the three studies are discussed in 
light of the proposed model of emotion recognition. It is concluded 
that the findings support several parts of the model. That is, situa-
tional and facial expressive cues may serve as distal cues of emotion 
recognition in adults and children. Perception of these cues may 
lead, via nonempathic inference, to cognitive understanding of the 
emotion. Perception of these cues may also lead to expressive and 
affective matching, but only via inferential empathy and not via 
noninferential empathy. We indirectly illustrated how the observers' 
proximal percepts may deviate from the actor's expressive distal cues, 
and how this may influence the observers' emotion recognition 
responses. The usefulness of distinguishing between a perceptual pro-
cess leading to proximal percepts and a cognitive inference process 
leading to cognitive understanding was also demonstrated. Some parts 
of the model needing further research are the contribution of the phy-
siological and subjective components to emotion recognition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Elnotion recognition refers to the process by which a person (the 
observer) comes to know how another person (the actor) feels. In 
theories of emotion, emotions have been conceived as having several 
components. In our research, we will investigate the contribution of 
some of these components of the actor's emotion to the observer's emo-
tion recognition. Therefore, we will describe the components of emo-
tion as outlined in theories of emotion. 
Components of emotion 
At least four components of emotion have been discerned (e.g., 
Frijda, 1969; Izard, 1977; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981; Scherer, 
198I). First, the cognitive component of emotion is one's appraisal 
of the emotion-arousing situation. Second, the expressive component 
of emotion refers to the observable changes in the outward appearance 
caused by endocrine and muscular activities. Third, the physiological 
component of emotion encompasses changes in the bodily processes such 
as visceral, somatic, and neural processes preparing the organism for 
action. Fourth, the subjective component of emotion is the subjective 
experience or conscious feeling of an emotion. Although most theories 
of emotion agree upon these four components of emotion, they differ 
with respect to the importance of each component as well as the 
interrelations of the components. For example, some theories conceptu-
alize emotions as having essentially a physiological basis (e.g., Can-
non, 1927; James, 1884; Lange, 1885). Some phenomenologically 
oriented emotion theories emphasize the subjective component of emo-
tion (e.g., Sartre, 1948). Others maintain that emotions are deter-
mined primarily by the cognitive component (e.g., Arnold, 1968; 
Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970). Still others view emotion as a 
result of the interaction between the cognitive and physiological com-
ponent (e.g., Schachter, 1964). Finally, still others have a concept 
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of emotion which is based mainly on the expressive and physiological 
component (e.g., Izard, 1971, 1977; Tomklns, 1962). 
We assume that all four components of emotion may play a role in 
emotion recognition. Starting from this assumption, we developed a 
theoretical model of emotion recognition. This model will be used as a 
framework for our research on emotion recognition. 
A model of emotion recognition 
Our model of emotion recognition (see Figure 1) is an elaboration 
of a Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1956) for emotion recognition 
as proposed by Scherer (1978, 1981). Since Scherer's focus has been on 
emotion recognition from vocal expressions, his model is restricted to 
the contribution of the expressive component to emotion recognition. 
In our model, all four components of emotion recognition are 
represented. 
In our view, the actor's emotion is conceived as having four com-
ponents which are externally represented by distal cues. The distal 
cues are perceptually represented in the observer via perceptual 
processes. The corresponding proximal percepts may then activate 
cognitive/affective inference processes which lead to one or more 
responses reflecting emotion recognition. We will now explain each of 
the parts of the model illustrated in Figure 1 in more detail. 
Ehotion components. As outlined in the previous section, we dis-
tinguish between four emotion components, i.e., the cognitive, expres-
sive, physiological, and subjective components of the actor's emotion. 
Distal cues. Each of the four emotion components is externalized 
via distal cues, i.e., observable and objectively measurable parame-
ters. The cognitive component is externalized via situational cues, 
which are cues in the emotion-arousing situation the actor is in. The 
expressive component is externalized via definite patterns of facial, 
gestural, postural, and physiological reactions, as well as specific 
vocalizations. The physiological component is externally represented 
by physiological changes in the actor, e.g., changes in heart rate and 
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Figure 1. Dlagraimatic representation of a model of enotion recognition. The arrows indicate temporal sequences in the process 
of emotion recognition. Numbers refer to processes represented in earlier views on emotion recognition. 1 - 3 - 5 - 7 - ΙΟί 
Scherer's Brunswiklan lens model; 1/5 - 6/7 - 10: the categorical approach, the dimensional approach, Flavell's nonempathic 
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feedback; 4/5 - 6/7 - 9 - 10/14: Flavell's inferential empathy, Feshbach's affective empathy; 4 - 6 - 10: Borke's cognitive 
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Chapter I 
muscle tonus. Finally, the subjective component may be externalized by 
verbal affective cues, e.g., when the actor gives a verbal report of 
his/her subjective feelings. 
Perceptual processes. The distal cues are the sensory-input from 
which the observer may recognize the actor's emotion. The situational, 
expressive, and affective distal cues are perceived primarily via 
visual and auditory perception. Perception of the physiological 
distal cues may occur via the touch sense, i.e., the observer senses 
physiological changes in close physical contact with the actor. 
Proximal percepts. Perceptual processes in the observer will lead 
to proximal percepts of each of the distal cues, i.e., the situa-
tional, expressive, physiological, and affective cues. The proximal 
percepts of the situational cues in the observer will often involve 
some sort of cognitive match with the cognitive component of the 
actor's emotion, since the actor and observer both perceive similar 
situational cues. As will be shown below, there may also be matches of 
the other three components in the observer. 
Cognitive/affective inference processes. Following Flavell, we 
distinguish three possible processes that mediate between proximal 
percepts and emotion recognition responses. First, each of the proxi-
mal percepts may activate a cognitive nonempathic inference process in 
the observer. That is, the observer infers the actor's emotion unac-
companied by any corresponding feeling of him/herself. Second, this 
nonempathic inference process may activate an affective process of 
inferential empathy in the observer. That is, in addition to a nonem-
pathic inference of the actor's emotion, an arousal of some sort of 
related feeling in the observer may occur. Third, each of the proximal 
percepts may activate an affective process of noninferential empathy. 
That is, the actor's emotion triggers off a similar emotion in the 
observer but without any cognitive inference of the actor's emotion. 
Bnotion recognition responses. We distinguish between four emotion 
recognition responses, i.e., cognitive understanding, expressive 
matching, physiological matching, and affective matching réponses. 
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Cognitive understanding of the actor's emotion is the outcome of the 
cognitive nonempathic inference process in the observer. The three 
matching responses are the result of both affective processes of 
inferential and noninferential empathy in the observer. Expressive, 
physiological, and affective matching correspond to the expressive, 
physiological, and subjective component of the actor's emotion. 
Relation of our model with earlier views on emotion recognition 
Parts of the process of emotion recognition to which our model 
refers have been presented in earlier views on emotion recognition. To 
demonstrate the utility of our model for an integration of findings on 
emotion recognition, we will discuss several of these views and deter-
mine whether and how they are represented in our model. 
Scherer's model of emotion recognition. Scherer (1978, 1981) has 
proposed a Brunwikian lens model (Brunswik, 1956) as a useful paradigm 
for the study of emotion recognition from the voice. As noted above, 
our model is an elaboration of this approach. According to Scherer's 
model, an actor externalizes his/her emotions via expressive distal 
cues, e.g., vocal expressions. These expressive distal cues are per-
ceived by observers and yield proximal cues, i.e., subjective percepts 
of distal cues. Finally, cognitive inference processes are used to 
arrive at an emotion attribution based on the proximal cues. 
Scherer's model is incorporated in our model by the process running 
from the actor's expressive component and corresponding expressive 
distal cues via auditory perception by the observer to perceptual 
representation of these distal cues. The resulting proximal percepts 
activate a nonempathic inference process leading to cognitive under-
standing of the actor's emotion (see Figure 1). 
The dimensional and categorical approach to emotion recognition. 
Frijda (1970) has described the process of emotion recognition as a 
two-stage process. First, observers determine the position of the 
expression on several dimensions of emotion, e.g., the degree of 
expressed (un)pleasantness, attention, and activity level. Next, a 
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further subspecification of this position is made on the basis of 
situational cues, thereby takln? into account knowledge of the opera-
tion of display rules. This view implies that observers think about an 
actor's emotions in terms of underlying dimensions. Several research-
ers of the dimensional approach have proposed two, three, or more-
dimensional models in which each emotion is determined by its place 
along the various dimensions (e.g., Bullock & Russell, in press; 
Frijda, 1970; Russell, 1980; Schlosberg, 1954). However, there is 
still much controversy about the nature and nunber of specific dimen-
sions. The only consistent finding is a dimension of pleasantness-
unpleasantness and to a lesser extent, an intensity-control dimension 
(see Ekman et al., 1972, chap. 14). 
According to Ekman and Friesen (1969), recognition of emotion is 
based on the observers' knowledge of universal facial expressions for 
each specific «notion category, and their knowledge of (sub)culture-
specific relations between situations and emotions including socially 
learned display rules for the expression of emotions. In this view, 
it is assuned that observers think about an actor's emotions in terras 
of discrete categories of emotion. Starting ftOin this assumption, 
researchers have found evidence for a set of basic distinctive 
categories of emotions (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972, chap. 
13; Izard, 1971; Tomkins & McCarter, 1964). 
Both the dimensional and categorical approach are represented in 
our model by the process which runs from the proximal percepts of 
situational and expressive cues via nonempathic inference to cognitive 
understanding of the actor's emotion in terms of emotion 
dimensions/categories (see Figure 1). 
Flavell's view on anotion recognition. Flavell (1977) has dis-
tinguished three possible ways for emotion recognition, i.e., nonem-
pathic inference, inferential empathy, and noninferential empathy. We 
have incorporated these three processes in our model to represent 
cognitive/affective processes that mediate between the observer's 
proximal percepts and the observer's responses reflecting anotion 
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recognition. According to Flavell, perception of situational and 
expressive cues may activate a process of nonempathic inference in the 
observer, which may lead to cognitive understanding of the actor's 
emotion. In inferential empathy, the observer experiences a similar 
emotion him/herself (i.e., affective matching) in addition to infer-
ring the actor's emotion. Finally, in noninferential empathy percep-
tion of expressive cues triggers off a similar feeling in the observer 
(i.e., affective matching) but without any cognitive inference of the 
actor's emotion. In our model, we have assumed that these three 
processes may not only be activated by perception of situational 
and/or expressive cues but by the perception of all four possible 
cues. Furthermore, we assumed that inferential and noninferential 
empathy may not only result in affective matching but also in expres-
sive and physiological matching (see Figure 1). 
Borke's cognitive anpathy. Borke's (1971) conception of 'cognitive 
empathy' as cognitive understanding of the actor's emotion in the 
situation is similar to Flavell's nonempathic inference. It is 
represented in our model by the process which runs from the proximal 
percepts of situational cues in the observer via nonempathic inference 
to cognitive understanding of the actor's emotion (see Figure 1). 
Feshbach's affective empathy. Feshbach's (1975) concept of affec-
tive empathy is similar to Flavell's inferential empathy. It refers to 
a matching affective response by the observer which is mediated 
through cognitive understanding of the actor's emotion as expressed on 
the face and in the situation. This view is represented in our model 
by the process running from the proximal percepts of situational and 
expressive cues in the observer via nonempathic inference to inferen-
tial empathy which leads to an affective match in the observer (see 
Figure 1). 
Motor mimicry and afferent feedback. Flavell's process of nonin-
ferential empathy is similar to what has been called 'motor mimicry 
and afferent feedback' in one of the earliest views on empathy (Lipps, 
1926; see also Hofftnan, 1970). According to this view, an observer 
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involuntarily imitates the actor's expression. He/she then experiences 
an emotion similar to the actor's emotion by receiving afferent feed­
back of facial muscles involved in motor mimicry. This process is 
represented in our model running from the observer's percepts of 
expressive cues via noninferential empathy to expressive matching 
(motor mimicry), which runs via physiological matching (afferent feed­
back) to affective matching (see Figure 1). 
Egocentrian-nonegocentrism and centration-decentration. Higgins 
(198I) has described role taking development as reflecting two 
developmental processes which are derived from Piaget's theory of cog­
nitive development (e.g., Piaget, 1970). First, role taking develop­
ment requires a development from egocentrism to nonegocentrism, i.e., 
acquiring the ability to prevent one's own point of view to interfere 
with that of others when making social judgments. Second, role taking 
development reflects a development from centration to decentration, 
i.e., acquiring the ability to simultaneously consider two or more 
mental elements when making social judgments. Role taking refers to 
the process of taking into consideration another's viewpoint when mak­
ing social judgments. Since emotion recognition may be considered аз 
a social judgment process, both developmental processes may be applied 
to the development of emotion recognition. 
Egocentrism and nonegocentrism have most often been applied to 
children's emotion recognition. Egocentric children are assuned to 
base their emotion recognitions on appraisal of the actor's situation 
as if they themselves were in that situation. In other words, these 
children assune that the actor's emotion is similar to the emotion 
they themselves would experience in such a situation. Nonegocentric 
children realize that the actor in the same situation may experience 
emotions different from their own, and that the situation is not a 
reliable source for inferring the actor's emotion. Instead, they will 
base their emotion recognitions on the actor's expression rather than 
on the situation. 
Centration and decentration may also be applied to emotion 
18 
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recognition in children. Centered children may be either egocentric 
or nonegocentric in their emotion recognitions. That is, centered 
children are egocentric when they center on the situation, while they 
are nonegocentric when they center on the actor's expression. Decen-
tered children, on the other hand, do not recognize emotions by 
centering on only one set of cues. They are aware that the actor's 
expression does not need to be in agreement with the actor's appraisal 
of the situation. In other words, they realize that both situational 
and expressive cues have to be taken into consideration in emotion 
recognition. 
In our model, egocentric, nonegocentric, centered, and decentered 
emotion recognition all run via nonempathic inference to cognitive 
understanding of the actor's emotion. However, in centered/egocentric 
emotion recognition, the observer centers on the situational distal 
cues, whereas in centered/nonegocentric emotion recognition he/she 
centers on the actor's expressive distal cues. Finally, in decentered 
emotion recognition both the situational and expressive distal cues 
are taken into consideration (see Figure 1). 
Conclusion 
The model of emotion recognition presented in Figure 1 proves to be 
a useful theoretical framework for the integration of the diverse 
views on emotion recognition. As is shown in Figure 1, all discussed 
views are represented in our model. It should be noted that according 
to all views, emotion recognition is limited to the cognitive and/or 
expressive component of the actor's emotion. Apparently, situational 
and expressive distal cues are considered to be major and sufficient 
sources for emotion recognition. Although we assume that the physio-
logical and subjective component of the actor's emotion may also con-
tribute to emotion recognition, we agree with these views that 
people's emotion recognitions are most likely to be based on the cog-
nitive and expressive component. A reason for this might be that emo-
tions are often nonverbally communicated. As a consequence, verbal 
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affective cues of emotion may often not be perceivable, which would 
mean that a contribution of the subjective component to emotion recog-
nition is less likely and not necessary· In addition, because 
interactions involving close physical contact are relatively rare, 
physiological cues of emotion may often not be perceived, which would 
mean that a contribution of the physiological component to emotion 
recognition is also less likely. 
Following most views on emotion recognition, we will restrict the 
focus of our research to the contribution of the cognitive and expres-
sive components of the actor's emotion to the observer's emotion 
recognition. In other words, we will further explore the role of the 
situational and expressive distal cues in emotion recognition. More 
specifically, we will investigate whether and when the perception of 
these cues will activate each of the three cognitive-affective infer-
ence processes and what emotion recognition responses will be the 
result. 
Present research 
The present research deals with three issues concerning the role of 
situational and/or expressive distal cues in emotion recognition. A 
first issue (study 1) involves specifying correspondences between 
expressive distal cues and observers' cognitive understanding of 
expressed emotions. This was examined by determining whether emotion 
predictions based on objectively measured facial expressive distal 
cues for a number of basic emotions agreed with observers' cognitive 
understanding of these expressed emotions. 
A second issue (study 2) concerns children's reliance on situa-
tional and expressive distal cues in their emotion recognition at 
various ages. We assessed whether children were able to nonempathicly 
infer various emotions from their perception of the actor's situa-
tional and/or facial expressive distal cues. In addition, we assessed 
the validity of Higgins' two developmental role taking processes in 
emotion recognition. That is, we assessed whether children's emotion 
20 
Introduction 
recognitions reflected a development from centration to decentration 
and/or from egocentrian to nonegocentriam. 
A third issue (study 3) concerns whether and when children's emo-
tion recognition from situational and expressive distal cues occurs 
via the processes of nonempathic inference, inferential empathy, and 
noninferential empathy. This was investigated by showing situational 
distal cues, facial expressive distal cues, and both types of distal 
cues, and then evaluating the interdependency of the responses 
reflecting cognitive understanding, expressive matching, and affective 
matching. Those aspects of our model of emotion recognition on which 
studies 1, 2, and 3 focus are indicated in Figure 1. 
Rationale for study _1_. In this study, we have restricted our 
attention to one of the most important expressive distal cues, i.e., 
facial expressions. There is evidence for a limited number of 
discrete categories of universal facial expressions of emotions 
including happiness, fear, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, shame, 
and contanpt (for reviews, see Ekman et al., 1972, chap. 13; Izard, 
1971). However, attempts to delineate specific facial expressive 
distal cues that underly observers' cognitive understanding of basic 
emotions have resulted in findings which are incomplete and difficult 
to compare and integrate. This is due partly to differences in the 
emotion stimuli in the studies, e.g., in the nunber and nature of the 
emotions expressed and facial cues used, in number of posers used, and 
in the mode of presentation (photographs or films). Also, most 
researchers used their own limited systems for the description of 
facial expressive distal cues with little attention given to the vali-
dity and reliability of their descriptions (for a review, see Ekman, 
1981). Recently, two reliable objective methods for the measurement 
of facial expressive distal cues of emotion were developed, i.e., 
Ekman and Friesen's (1978) Facial Action Coding System (FACS), and 
Izard's (1979) Maximally Discriminative Facial Movement Coding System 
(MAX). Both are descriptive systens of facial action and are based on 
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the analysis of the anatomical muscular basis of facial movement. 
In our study, we selected from Ekman and Friesen's FACS facial 
expressive cues which were hypothesized to be distal cues for each of 
eight basic emotions of happiness, fear, sadness, anger, disgust, 
surprise, shame, and contempt. Adult actors were instructed to pose 
facial composites containing these expressive distal cues according to 
instructions from FACS. The resulting videotaped facial expressions 
were shown to naive adult observers to assess whether their cognitive 
understanding of expressed emotions agreed with FACS-based predictions 
regarding the facial expressive distal cues involved in expressions of 
each basic emotion. Study 1 has been reported in a published 
manuscript (Wiggers, 1982) and is presented in Chapter II. 
Rationale for study 2. Past research has demonstrated that 3- to 
4-year-olds are able to cognitively understand emotions such as happi­
ness, fear, sadness, and anger from situational distal cues (e.g., 
Borke, 1971) or from facial expressive distal cues (e.g., Izard, 
1971). Very little is known, however, about children's understanding 
of other, more complex emotions, such as surprise, shame, and contempt 
from situational and facial expressive distal cues. There is some evi­
dence that most Θ- and 9-year-olds are not yet able to recognize shame 
and contempt from facial expressive distal cues (Izard, 1971; Wiggers, 
1977). In addition, findings about children's reliance on situational 
or facial expressive distal cues in the course of development have 
been very inconsistent, as Figure 2 shows. Some studies (Burns & 
Cavey, 1957; Gove & Keating, 1979; Greenspan, Barenboim, & Chandler, 
1976; Hughes, Tingle, & Sawin, 1981) have demonstrated an increase 
with age in expression-based inferences and a decrease in situation-
based inferences of the actor's emotions (see Figure 2). Such find­
ings have often been interpreted in terms of Higgins' developmental 
process of egocentrism-nonegocentrism. That is, egocentric children 
base their emotion judgments on their own appraisal of the situation 
the actor is in. Nonegocentric children realize that the actor in the 
same situation may experience emotions different from their own, and 
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will attend to the actor's expression. However, other studies in Fig­
ure 2 contradict this notion either because no such trend occurred 
(Deutsch, 1974; Greenspan et al., 1976) or an opposite trend was found 
(lanotti, 1978; Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975; Reichenbach & Masters, 1983). 
Therefore, it seems more appropriate to assume a development according 
to Higgins' process of centration-decentration. That is, centered 
children infer the actor's emotions by centering on either the situa­
tional cues (i.e., egocentrism) or on the expressive cues (i.e., none-
gocentrian). Decentered children are able to simultaneously consider 
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Figure 2. Percentages of children who gave expression-baaed responses iiinus children who 
gave situation-based responses as a function of age in past studies on 
children's nonempathic inferences of emotions. The original data reported in 
the studies were converted into percentages situation-based and expression-based 
responses. All studies used discrepance between situational and expressive cuss 
of emotion, except Hughes et a l . (1981) arri Qove and Keating (1979). Hughes et 
a l . using nondiscrepant cue combinations, explvcitly asked their subjects from 
villch cues they inferred the emotion. Gove and Keating's subjects had to 
discriminate the emotions of two children in the same situation but with dif­
ferent facial expressions. Percentages of Greenspan et a l . (1976a) in the fig­
ure, referring to the subjects' i n i t i a l judgnent of the emotion of the target-
person, are a rough estimate since their study did not report the exact data. 
Percentages of Greenspan et a l . (1976b) in the figu-e refer to the same sub­
jec t s ' judgment of the facial expression of the target-регээп. 
23 
Chapter I 
situational and expressive cues. Which cues have prevalence when there 
are conflicting situational and expressive cues, will depend on other 
factors such as perceptual salience of cues and complexity of the emo-
tions involved. 
In our study, videotaped episodes in which various emotions were 
portrayed by actors using varying distal cue combinations were 
presented to 4- to 8-year-olds. Tie cue combinations involved non-
discrepant and discrepant combinations of situational and facial 
expressive distal cues, as well as situational or expressive distal 
cues alone. Facial expressive distal cues were selected using the 
results of study 1 (Wiggers, 1982). To replicate earlier findings 
about recognition of simple emotions, we presented nondiscrepant 
distal cues for the simple basic emotions of happiness, fear, sadness, 
anger, and disgust. To assess children's ability to recognize more 
complex emotions, we showed nondiscrepant distal cues for the complex 
basic emotions of surprise, shame, and contempt. Discrepant distal 
cues were included to assess whether there were developmental trends 
in children's cognitive understanding coded as expression-consistent 
or situation-consistent. The hypothesized effect of perceptual sali-
ence of discrepant cues was tested by varying the intensity of the 
emotions depicted in each of the cues and thereby varying cue sali-
ence. The expected effect of complexity of emotions involved in the 
discrepant distal cues was assessed by using various combinations of 
cues including both simple and complex emotions. Finally, we checked 
whether situational and facial expressive distal cues were perceptu-
ally represented in proximal percepts in the children by asking than 
to specify the cues from which they inferred the emotion. This allowed 
us to assess whether children's emotion recognitions at various ages 
reflected centered/egocentric, centered/nonegocentric, or decentered 
inferences. Study 2 has been described in a manuscript submitted for 
publication and is presented in Chapter III. 
Rationale for study 3,. Many studies on children's emotion recogni-
tion have dealt with nonempathic inferences (e.g., Borke, 1971; Izard, 
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1971). In addition, there have been many studies dealing with 
children's inferential empathy (e.g., Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Mood, 
Johnson, & Shantz, 1978). However, we know of no study investigating 
the possibility of noninferential empathy in children. 
In our study, we assessed whether children's emotion recognition 
runs via the processes of nonempathic inference, inferential empathy, 
and noninferential empathy reflecting motor mimicry and afferent feed-
bade. We presented videotaped episodes in which actors portrayed emo-
tions. We used part of the stimulus materials of study 2, i.e., the 
nondiscrepant combinations of situational and facial expressive distal 
cues for happiness, fear, sadness, and anger, as well as the situa-
tional and facial expressive distal cues alone. We measured three 
emotion recognition responses: cognitive understanding, affective 
matching, and facial expressive matching. Children's cognitive under-
standing was measured by asking them to identify the actor's emotion. 
Affective matching was measured by asking them to describe their own 
subjective feelings. Facial expressive matching was assessed by 
applying Ekman and Friesen's FACS to children's expressive reactions 
to the videotaped episodes. 
Whether the three cognitive/affective inference processes occurred, 
was evaluated by studying the interdependency of the three measured 
emotion recognition responses. Noninferential empathy reflecting 
motor mimicry and afferent feedback was assuned to occur when the 
actor's expressive cues elicited facial expressive matching (motor 
mimicry) which led to affective matching (afferent feedback). Inferen-
tial empathy was assuned to occur when children's affective matching 
responses were contingent upon their cognitive understanding of the 
actor's emotion. Finally, nonempathic inferences were assuned to occur 
when the children cognitively understood the actor's emotion but no 
In study 3. we used terras which are more coramon in the empathy 
literature, i.e., cognitive empathie response (= cognitive under-
standing), affective empathie response (= affective matching), and 
facial empathie response (= facial expressive matching). 
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corresponding affective or facial expressive matching occurred. Study 
3 has been reported in a published manuscript (Wiggers i Willems, in 
press) and is presented in Chapter IV. 
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Chapter II 
STUDY 1 
(Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 1982, 7, 101-116) 
JUDGMENTS OF FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 
OF EMOTION PREDICTED 
FROM FACIAL BEHAVIOR 
Michiel Wiggers 
ABSTRACT: An experiment was performed to assess whether Ekman and 
Friesen's Facial Action Coding System (FACS) could be used to construct 
facial expressions that portrayed with varying intensities each of the 
eight emotions of happiness, fear, disgust, sadness, surprise, shame, 
anger, and contempt. Based on detailed instructions from FACS, seven 
adults posed facial expressions that presumably varied in the conveyed 
emotion and emoticn intensity. Thirty-nine college student observers 
then viewed each of the videotaped facial expressions. Ratings were 
made of whether each expression connoted one of the eight emotions or 
no emotion and of the intensity of the perceived emotion. Observers' 
emotion classification and intensity ratings agreed with FACS-based pre-
dictions regarding the facial action units involved in expressing each of 
the emotions. Most perceived-predicted emotion discrepancies could be 
accounted for by facial action units shared by the different emotions. 
Moreover, except for disgust, observers' intensity judgments reflected a 
reliance on only one or two action units for each emotion. These findings 
corroborate the descriptive and predictive utility of FACS for studies on 
perception of emotions. 
Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1972) have suggested that at 
least seven discrete categories of universal expressions of emotion 
can be discerned. In their view, the seven basic emotions include 
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interest, happiness, fear, sadness, anger, disgust/contempt, and sur-
prise, although the emotion interest was later excluded because 
evidence for the universality of its expression was insufficient and 
its facial signs are very subtle (Ekman & Friesen, 1975, p. 100). 
Similarly, Izard (1971) (following Tomkins & McCarter, 1964) sug-
gested nine fundamental emotions, including shame and distin-
guishing contempt from disgust (for a discussion of these lists see 
Emde, Kligman, Reich, & Wade, 1978). These emotions were postu-
lated because a number of studies have demonstrated that adults 
from different cultures can recognize emotions from posed facial 
expressions seen in isolation from situational contexts (for reviews 
see Ekman, et al., 1972; Ekman & Oster, 1979; Izard, 1971, 1977). 
Nevertheless, the investigations from which these universal 
emotions were identified still suffer from the problem of delineat-
ing the facial patterns that underlie the basic emotions. That is, 
can specific judgments of emotions be predicted from facial 
information described in an unambiguous and reliable way? 
Several attempts at estimating the importance of different 
facial areas on the judgment of emotions have produced complex 
and inconsistent findings (reviewed by Ekman et al., 1972, Ch. 17). 
Moreover, while other researchers tried to systematize facial 
expressions of particular emotions, their systems were based on 
analyses of limited photographic samples, which usually depicted 
only static facial expressions (e.g., Blurton Jones, 1971; Ekman. 
Friesen, & Tomkins, 1971; Frois-Wittman, 1930; Izard, 1979; for a 
review, see Ekman, 1981). Consequently, most of these systems are 
not comprehensive, almost all of them combine inference-free 
descriptors with descriptors confused with inference, and most of 
the descriptive categories are not mutually exclusive. All these 
limitations may have their impact on the validity and reliability of 
these descriptive systems. 
In order to overcome these difficulties, Ekman and Friesen 
(1976, 1978a) recently developed a comprehensive descriptive 
system of facial action by analyzing the anatomical muscular basis 
of facial movement. This system is called FACS, the Facial Action 
Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1978a). FACS distinguishes 
among 44 facial Action Units. These represent the minimal units 
that are anatomically separate and visually distinguishable. In 
addition, FACS contains 14 more grossly defined Action Units of 
head and eye positions. Any facial activity can be described 
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reliably in terms of the particular Action Units which singly or in 
combination produced it. Moreover, the amount of activity 
present in each Action Unit can be scored for three levels of 
intensity (i.e., slight, moderate, and extreme). 
Ekman and Friesen (1978b) listed several predictions concern-
ing which Action Unit combinations are associated with specific 
emotion expressions. However, they neither specified how they de-
rived these predictions, nor presented evidence in support of them. 
Some evidence can be derived from studies using widely different 
approaches (for a review, see Ekman & Friesen, in preparation), 
e.g., observation of emotion expressions in real-life situations 
(Camras, 1977, 1980), observation of elicited emotions in labora-
tory situations (Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980; Hiatt, Campos, & 
Emde, 1979; Izard, Huebner, Risser, McCinnes, & Dougherty, 1980), 
and judgment of posed facial expressions (Bassili, 1978, 1979). 
These studies contain indications for some facial Action Units 
which are signs of some basic emotions. However, the evidence is 
far from complete. Moreover, not all these studies used FACS 
descriptors, and not all of them used the same set of emotions. 
This makes their results difficult to compare. FACS descriptors 
were used only in the Camras (1980) study dealing with sadness, 
anger, and disgust, and in the Ekman et al. (1980) study which 
resulted in evidence for facial signs of happiness and disgust.' 
The present study was designed to collect evidence about 
emotion predictions by studying the relationship between FACS-
specified facial actions and observer ratings of emotions. FACS 
was used (1) for the construction of the various combinations of 
facial Action Units, as well as (2) for the instructions to student 
actors to portray eight basic emotions, and (3) for later descrip-
tions of the resulting expressed emotions. Subsequently, using 
these portrayals, it was determined whether naive observers per-
ceived the predicted emotion categories from the posed facial 
expressions. Finally, it was determined whether observers' ratings 
of intensity of expressed emotions corresponded with the intended 
intensity of the emotion in the facial composites. Intended inten-
sities were based on the amount of activity present in each facial 
Action Unit (i.e., slight, moderate, and extreme). 
'A table summarizing the evidence derived from studies about correspondences 
between facial actions and expression of basic emotions is available from the author. 
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METHOD 
Materials and Procedure 
Preparation of emotion expression stimuli. Emotions were portrayed 
using only those Action Units from FACS that were predicted to be 
associated with each of eight emotions1 of happiness, fear, sadness, 
anger, disgust, surprise, shame, and contempt. Of the many possible 
variants of Action Unit combinations, we chose a few variants for each 
emotion, based mainly on the list of emotion predictions presented by 
Ekman and Friesen (1978b). In addition, some combinations were based 
on the emotion predictions in Izard's (1979) Maximally Discriminative 
Facial Movement Coding System (MAX), e.g., shame and contempt com­
binations, and on predictions by Ekman and Friesen (1975). Two 
combinations were used to portray sadness, surprise, and shame; four 
combinations were used to portray happiness, fear, disgust, and con­
tempt, and five were used to portray anger. This resulted in a total of 27 
Action Unit combinations. Some Action Units in these combinations 
were unique to a specific emotion, other Action Units were not, i.e., they 
were predicted to be a sign of two or more emotions. Inclusion of unique 
and nonunique Action Units allowed us to assess whether uniqueness of 
an Action Unit influenced the accuracy with which observers classified 
the different emotions. 
Four male and three female university students were instructed to 
pose each Action Unit combination. The instructions, based largely on 
the FACS manual (Ekman & Friesen, 1978a), consisted of verbal descrip­
tions with photographic and f i lmed illustrations of appearance changes 
for each Action Unit and Action Unit combination. The instructions 
never made reference to the emotion that each Action Unit combination 
was designed to portray. In addition, the posers were given an 
opportunity to practice each Action Unit combination in front of a 
mirror. Upon completing their practice, videorecordings were made of 
the 27 Action Unit combinations. Each combination was performed by 
three of the posers who could easily produce all of the Action Units in 
the combination, except one anger and one contempt combination 
which only two posers were able to perform. After each performance, the 
posers received feedback from the FACS-trained experimenter who 
checked whether the Action Units were performed as instructed. If not, 
another attempt was recorded. During performance, posers sat in front of 
a mirror. A primarily frontal view of the face was maintained by placing 
the mirror behind the camera. Using this procedure, 79 facial expressions 
'Although jealousy was initially included as the ninth emotion, it was later omitted 
because it did not fit into the previously mentioned lists of universal expressions of emotions 
(Ekman et al, 1972, Izard, 19Л). 
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were videotaped. Each videotaped expression started with a neutral or 
almost neutral face and was frozen at the apex of the intended 
expression for 20 seconds. 
FACS-based evaluation of emotion expression stimuli. In order to 
evaluate the instructed facial expressions, two FACS-trained coders — 
having completed their FACS Final Test (Ekman & Friesen, 1978b, p. 140) 
with satisfactory mean intercoder agreement ratios of .82 and .84— 
applied FACS to the 79 videotaped facial expressions. Based on both 
coders' scorings of the recorded expressions, an agreement ratio (see 
Ekman & Friesen, 1978b, p. 24) was calculated for each expression 
separately. The mean agreement ratio between the two coders across all 
expressions was .88. Coder disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
The mean agreement ratio after discussion between the Action Units 
scored by the coders and the Action Units instructed to the posers was 
.89. Most scored-instructed discrepancies appeared to be caused by the 
adding of some slight, irrelevant actions by the posers, e.g., a slight head 
movement. However, in two contempt expressions, relevant Action Units 
were incorrectly omitted or added by the posers. These two expressions 
were excluded from further analysis, leaving a total of 77 expressions. 
Observers' evaluation of emotion expressions. Twenty male and 19 
female Dutch university students evaluated the recorded emotion ex-
pressions. Observers were run in groups of nine-to-ten persons. Upon 
arrival, each observer received a booklet that contained a list of nine 
emotion categories (including one neutral category), a 6-point emotion 
intensity scale, instructions about the use of the list and the scale, and a 
numbered response sheet corresponding to the numbers assigned to the 
presented expressions. 
The recorded expressions were presented in a fixed randomized 
order on two monitors in a classroom. For each expression, observers 
were asked to check which of eight emotion categories corresponded 
best to the emotion portrayed in the frozen apex. To facilitate observers' 
understanding of the emotion categories, two or three emotion synonyms 
were given for each emotion category. In addition, a ninth category of 
neutral was available. After classifying an expression, observers rated it 
on a 6-point scale of emotional intensity: 0 = neutral, 1 = minimal, 2 = 
slight, 3 = moderate, 4 = strong, 5 = extreme. 
RESULTS 
Labeling of Expressions 
For each expression, the proportion of observers who chose 
each of the eight possible emotion labels was calculated. The 
percentages for the 77 expressions grouped together according to 
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the FACS-based emotion predictions are presented in Table 1. The 
Action Unit combinations in Table 1 refer to the coders' scorings of 
the recorded facial expressions. Table 1 indicates which Action 
Units or Action Unit combinations are characteristic of the various 
basic emotions. In addition, it can be inferred which Action Units 
or Action Unit combinations lead to confusions or ambiguities 
between predicted and other emotion categories. A confusion or 
ambiguity was defined to occur when an expression was classified 
in the predicted emotion category by a majority of observers, but 
by a minority of more than 12.5 percent (i.e., higher than the 
chance level for choosing one out of eight emotion categories) in 
another emotion category. In the next section, results are reported 
for each of the eight basic emotions separately.' 
Happiness. In the predicted happiness expressions, a smile 
(Action Unit 12) may go along with cheek raising (Action Unit 6), or 
with opening the mouth, i.e., lip parting (Action Unit 25) or jaw 
dropping (Action Unit 26). These expressions yielded percentages 
of agreement among observers about happiness of 64-100 percent 
(see Table 1). Only one confusion above chance level occurred in 
the expression that shows only a very weak smile (Action Unit 12x), 
which led 31 percent of the observers to judge it as neutral. 
Fear. Of the predicted fear expressions, only those expressions 
involving a combination of brow raising (Action Units 1 +2), upper 
eyelid raising (Action Unit 5) and lip stretching (Action Unit 20), 
both at least at the moderate level (y or z), and mouth opening 
(Action Units 25 or 26), were found to yield percentages of agree-
ment between observers about fear above the level of 60 percent, 
ranging from 64-95 percent (see Table 1). Following the 12.5 
percent criterion, predicted fear expressions were confused with 
surprise, anger, and disgust. Most of these confusions could be 
explained by shared Action Units. For example, brow raising 
(Action Units 1+2 ) was predicted to be a sign of both fear and 
surprise. 
Disgust. The predicted disgust expressions involve upper lip 
raising (Action Unit 10) or nose wrinkling (Action Unit 9). In 
addition the mouth is opened (Action Unit 25 or 26) with or without 
tongue thrusting (Action Unit 19), or the chin is raised (Action Unit 
'A more detailed discussion of the emotion by emotion results is available from the 
author 
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17). These expressions were judged as disgust by 64-100 percent of 
the observers (see Table 1). The major confusions of predicted dis-
gust expressions, which occurred with anger and contempt, could 
all be ascribed to shared Action Units. For example, chin raising 
(Action Unit 17) and upper lip raising (Action Unit 10) were 
predicted to be signs of both disgust and contempt. 
Sadness. The predicted sadness expressions involve inner 
brow raising and drawing together (Action Units 1 +4), lip corner 
depressing (Action Unit 15), with or without lower eyelid raising 
(Action Unit 7) and lip parting (Action Unit 25). These combinations 
of Action Units were judged as representing sadness by 
percentages of observers ranging from 67-95 percent (see Table 1), 
while there was only one major confusion with fear. This confusion 
might be due to the wide-open eyes poser I normally has, which 
might have been misinterpreted as a sign of fear. 
Surprise. The predicted surprise expressions involve brow 
raising (Action Units 1 +2), jaw dropping (Action Unit 26), with or 
without slight to moderate upper eyelid raising (Action Unit 5x or 
y). The head may move up (Action Unit 54) and the eyes may move 
down (Action Unit 64). These expressions yielded percentages of 
between observer agreement about surprise ranging from 77-100 
percent (see Table 1). There were two major confusions of the 
surprise expressions with fear, with could be ascribed to the brow 
raising (Action Units 1 +2) as a sign of both surprise and fear. 
Shame. The predicted shame expressions involve lip biting 
(Action Unit 32) with lip parting (Action Unit 25), upper eyelid 
dropping (Action Unit 41) and head lowering (Action Unit 54). 
These expressions resulted in percentages of agreement between 
observers about shame ranging from 87-100 percent (see Table 1). 
Moreover, no confusions of the shame expressions with other 
emotions above chance level occurred. 
Anger. The predicted anger expressions involve brow lowering 
(Action Unit 4) with or without upper eyelid raising (Action Unit 5). 
In the mouth area, there may be some lip tightening (Action Unit 
23), upper lip raising (Action Unit 10), lower lip depressing (Action 
Unit 16), and opening of the mouth (Action Units 25 or 26). Except 
for poser W's expressions, 69-100 percent of the observers inter-
preted these expressions as anger (see Table 1). In three anger 
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Table 1 
Judgments o f Emotion and P e r c e i v e d I n t e n s i t y Rank Order f o r Each 
P r e d i c t e d Emotion 
P o s e r Sex A c t i o n U n i t s * i Judged a s p r e d i c t e d Mean rank c 
P r e d i c t e d h a p p i n e s s e x p r e s s i o n s 
Ha m 12x 6 4 · 3 . 0 0 
λ f 6 x + 1 2 x t 2 5 92 5 . 7 6 
Ml m 12y 87 1 . 0 7 
Ha m 12y+25 95 Ч.Ч9 
W m 6 x + 1 2 y 95 5 . 0 5 
Ml m 6x+12y 87 6 . 5 0 
W л 6y+12y+25 77 Ч.ЧЧ 
Ma m 6 y + 1 2 y * 2 5 87 7 . 1 3 
Ha m 6 z + 1 2 y + 2 5 92 8 . 1 7 
W n 6 z + 1 2 z 82 8.115 
W m Ьг+У2г*гЬ 100 1 0 . 1 2 
A f 6 z + 1 2 z + 2 6 100 1 0 . 2 2 
P r e d i c t e d f e a r e x p r e s s i o n s 
I f 5y+20y*25 5 6 · 
I f 5 y t 2 0 y + 2 5 3 3 · 
H m ( 1 * 2 ) x + 5 y + 2 0 x + 2 5 2 6 · 
H m ( 1 + 2 ) y + 5 y + 2 0 x + 2 6 3 3 · 
Ч л ( 1 + 2 ) x + 5 y * 2 0 y + 2 5 8 5 2 . 6 1 
W m ( 1 + 2 ) y + 5 y + 2 0 y + 2 5 85 3 . 0 8 
I f ( 1 2 ) y + 5 y * 2 0 y + 2 5 64« 3 . 6 7 
A f ( 1 + 2 ) x + 5 z + 2 0 y + 2 5 69» 5 . 0 6 
H m (U2)y+5Z+20y. .-26 82« 5 . 6 1 
I f ( 1 2 ) z + 5 z + 2 0 y t 2 5 72» 5.63 
H m ( U 2 ) z + 5 z * 2 0 y * 2 6 79 5 . 1 9 
H m (U2)z<-5z+20z+26 95 5.89 
Predicted disgust expressions 
W m 10y+ +25 87 3.50 
Mi m 010y+ +25 72» 3.98 
H m 10z+ +25 74 1.81 
H η 9y+17y 87 5.91 
H o 9z+17y 90 5.07 
Hl m 9z+17z 82· 5.03 
W m 9y+ +25 95 6.20 
H α 9y+ +26 85 6.63 
I Г 9z+ +25 77» 8.53 
H o 9Z+19 +26 100 9.09 
I f 9Z+19 +26 64· 10.27 
J m 9Z+19 +26 97 10.86 
Predicted sadness expressions 
Ml • 1y+4x+7y+15x 87 2.07 
λ f 1y+4x+7y+15x+25 95 3.51 
Mi • 1z+4y+7y+15x+25 90 3.27 
Ι Г 1z+4y+ tlSy 67· 3.35 
I f 1z+1y+7y+15y+25 90 3.99 
A f 1z+4y+7y+15y+25 95 4.96 
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Table 1 continued 
Predicted surprise ехргеззіопз 
H ш (U2)y+ і-гб 97 2.50 
I f (1+2)y+ +26 77» 2.84 
W m (1+2)у+5х*26+53х+6Чх 92 3.01 
H m (U2)z+5y+26 100 5.03 
I f (U2)z<-5y+26 77* 5.20 
E f (1+2)zt5y+26 92 5.60 
Predicted shame expressions 
I f 25+32х+'11у + 5Чх>(1+2)х 95 2.85 
Ma л 25+32y+it1yt54x 37 3.2H 
A f г5+32у+Ч1у*5Чу 95 3.24 
A f 25«-32у*<Пу+5Чу 97 3.33 
I f 25+32y+41z+51y+(U2)x 100 4.31 
Ma o 25+32y<-11z+54z 95 1.12 
Predicted anger expressions 
W m ly+GSy 51· 
H m Чу+ 5y 72» 1.86 
I f Чу+ 5y 90 3.6I 
Η α R(U2*-Mx-»L4y+5x* +23x 19« 
Mi m 4у+ +23у 92 3.96 
A f 1у+ 5у+ +23у*25 87 14.59 
A f Izt 5yt +23у*25 97 7.79 
Mi m 4z+ +23Z+25 87 5.28 
W m R( 1+2+IOx+LUy+5x+L10x+ +25 28· 
Mi 9 1z+ +10x+23y+26 69» t.64 
A f 1z+ 5y+10y+23y+25 100 7.91 
W m M 1+2+4)x+L'ly+5x+10y + l6y+25 46· 
I f L2x+4y+ 5y+10x+16y+25 87 7.40 
Ml m 4z+ »ІОу+Ібу+гб 92 8.04 
Predicted contempt expressions 
W m fi(1+2)y+ +53x+64x 72» 3.46 
I f L2y+ +53y+6ity 87 4.41 
Ml m L2y+ +53y+64y 100 4.90 
Ml a L2y+L10x+L25+53y+64y 95 5.19 
I Г L2y+L10x+ 25+53y+64y 82 5.58 
E f (1+2)z+5y+R14x+53y+64y 79 3.89 
Ml m (1+2)z+ +L14x+53z+6liz 100 5. 6 
M il (1+2)z+ + 17y+53z+6«z 100 5.63 
Mi α (1+2)z+ + 17y+53z+64z 97 6.64 
"Numbers refer to type of Action Unit (for explanation see text); x, y, 
ζ represent slight, moderate, and extreme actions, respectively. All 
actions are bilateral unless when marked with L or В (unilateral action) 
or G (assymmetric action). 
η = 39; an asterisk Indicates when major confusions with different 
emotions occurred. 
For expressions not reaching 60$ agreement, intensity rank ordering was 
not calculated as indicated by dashes. 
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expressions, power W incorrectly added some unilateral brow 
raising and drawing together (Action Units R(1 + 2 + 4)). As a result, 
these expressions appeared to be very ambiguous. In particular, 
ambiguity between anger and fear occurred, which is in 
accordance with the prediction of this brow action (Action Units 
1 + 2 + 4) as a sign of fear. The remaining major confusions of the 
anger expressions with surprise and disgust could be explained by 
shared Action Units. For example, upper lip raising (Action Unit 10) 
as well as lower lip depressing (Action Unit 16) were predicted to 
be signs of both anger and disgust. 
Contempt. The predicted contempt expressions involve 
raising one outer brow corner (Action Unit L or R2), or unilateral (L 
or R) or bilateral brow raising (Action Units 1 +2). The head may 
move up (Action Unit 53) and the eyes may move down (Action 
Unit 64). In the lower face, there may be slight unilateral upper lip 
raising (Action Unit L or RlOx) with lip parting (Action Unit 25), or 
inward pulling of one mouth corner causing a dimple (Action Unit 
L or R14), or chin raising (Action Unit 17). These expressions were 
judged as representing contempt by 72-100 percent of the 
observers (see Table 1), while there was only one major confusion 
with surprise. This confusion could be ascribed to the brow raising 
(Action Units 1+2 ) which was predicted to be a sign of both 
contempt and surprise. 
Intensity of Emotion 
First, a priori predictions of relative intensities of expressed 
emotions were made. That is, for all combinations expressing each 
basic emotion, several intensity rank orders were constructed ac-
cording to the activity levels (i.e., slight, moderate, extreme) of 
single or combined Action Units. For example, three intensity rank 
orders of surprise expressions were predicted, one based on the 
amount of the brow raise (Action Units 1 +2), another based on the 
amount of the upper eyelid raise (Action Unit 5), and a third rank 
order based on the amount of brow raise and upper eyelid raise 
combined (Action Units 1 + 2 and Action Unit 5). Rank order pre-
dictions based on combined Action Units (e.g., the latter one for 
surprise) were constructed following a procedure similar to that 
used in partial order scalogram analysis (e.g., Shye, 1976). 
Second, for each basic emotion, a perceived intensity rank 
order was assessed in a two-step procedure. First, each observer's 
intensity ratings of all expressions in each emotion category were 
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rank ordered. Next, a mean intensity rank across all observers was 
calculated for each expression (see Table 1). No mean ranks were 
calculated when an expression did not reach 60 percent agreement 
between observers (i.e., four fear and four anger expressions). 
Third, the relative contribution of single or combined Action 
Units to the perceived intensity of each basic emotion was 
estimated. That is, for each basic emotion, the perceived rank 
order based on the mean intensity ranks was correlated with each 
of the predicted intensity rank orders based on single or combined 
Action Units (see Table 2). For this purpose, an adjusted form of 
tau was used. That is, the number of pairs in the perceived rank 
order in discordance with the predicted rank order was subtracted 
from the number of pairs in the perceived rank order in 
concordance with the predicted rank order. This result was then 
divided by the total number of pairs for which a rank order relation 
was predicted. 
As can be seen in Table 2, for all emotions but happiness and 
disgust, the perceived intensity rank order correlated 1 00 with one 
or more of the predicted intensity rank orders based on one or two 
Action Units. For example, for fear, the predicted intensity rank 
orders based on the upper eyelid raising (Action Unit 5) and/or the 
lip stretching (Action Unit 20) resulted in a 1.00 correlation with the 
perceived intensity rank order. Inclusion of other Action Units than 
Action Units 5 or 20 in predicting intensity rank orders for fear 
resulted in τ-values of less than 1.00. Apparently, all observers 
based their fear intensity ratings on the activity of Action Units 5 
and/or 20. Similarly, for surprise, all observers' intensity ratings 
were based on the brow raising (Action Units 1 + 2 ) and/or upper 
eyelid raising (Action Unit 5); for shame, on the lip biting (Action 
Unit 32) and/or upper eyelid dropping (Action Unit 41); for anger, 
on the brow lowering (Action Unit 4); for sadness, on the lip corner 
depressing (Action Unit 15), eyelid tightening (Action Unit 7), 
and/or lip parting (Action Unit 25); and for contempt, on the head 
and eye movement (Action Units 53 + 64). For happiness and 
disgust, the highest τ-values accompanying a predicted intensity 
rank order based on two combined Action Units were .79 and .74, 
respectively. This indicates that for happiness, intensity ratings 
were based mainly on the smile and accompanying cheek raising 
(Action Units 6 + 12); and for disgust, for the most part on the 
upper lip raising (Action Unit 10) and nose wrinkling (Action Unit 
9). However, for disgust, the predicted intensity rank order based 
on all Action Units combined resulted in the highest correlation 
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Table 2 
Correlat ion between Perceived Intens i ty Rank Order and Predicted Intens i ty Rank ft-dere for Each Baaic Qnotion 
Action U n i t i ' u a e d C o r r e l a t l o r f m t h 
I n i n t e n s i t y rank perceived i n t e n -
order p r e d i c t i o n s s i t y rank orderc 
Happiness 
(6-И2) 
(6+121+25/26 
25/26 
.79 
.77 
.53 
Disgust 
9 / 1 0 , 1 7 , 1 9 , 2 5 / 2 6 
17,19,25/26 
9/10 
.82 
.76 
.74 
Surprise 
(1+2) 
5 
( l + 2 ) + 5 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Shane 
32 
41 
32+Л1 
32+41+54 
41+54 
32+ 54 
54 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
.79 
.77 
.75 
.72 
Action U n i t i used 
i n i n t e n s i t y rank 
order predict ions 
C o r r e l a t i o r f w l t h 
perceived i n t e n ­
s i t y rank order11 
Fear 
5 
20 
5+20 
(1+2)+5+20 
( U 2 ) + 5 
5+20+25/26 
(1+2)+5+ 25/26 
(1+2)+5+20+25/26 
5+ 25/26 
20+25/26 
(1+2)+ 20 
25/26 
( 1 + 2 ) + 20+25/26 
(1+2) 
(1+2)+ 25/26 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
.92 
.91 
.83 
.83 
-63 
.81 
.81 
.75 
.73 
.72 
.71 
.71 
Anger 
4 
( 4 + 5 ) , 1 0 , 1 6 , 2 3 , 2 5 
4, 10,16,23,25 
10,16,23,25 
(4+5) 
1.00 
1.00 
.86 
.86 
.63 
Action Units"used 
In i n t e n s i t y rank 
order predictions 
C o r r e l a t i o n 0 w i t h 
perceived 
s i t y rank 
Sadness 
15+25 
7+15 
7+15+25 
(1+4)+ 15 
(1+4)+ 15+25 
(1+Л)+7+15+25 
П+4)+7+15 
15 
25 
(1+J|)+ +25 
(1+4)+7+ 25 
( 1+4 )+7 
7+ 25 
(1+4) 
7 
1 
1 
1 
i n t e n -
ordet^ 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.82 
.82 
.82 
.80 
.78 
.75 
.64 
.60 
.56 
.56 
.50 
.20 
Contempt 
14 
14 
14 
17,(L10+25) 
( l + 2 ) i 
17,(L10+25), 
1 7 , ( L 1 0 ^ 5 ) , ( l + 2 
(1+2 
(53+Í4) 1 
(53+64) 
(53+64) 
.00 
.73 
.68 
.64 
.58 
.41 
aNumber3 refer to type of Action Unit (for explanation з е t e x t ) . 
An adjusted form of tau was used: τ = (P-Q)/N, In yhlch Ρ = number of p a i r s in the perceived rank order in 
concordance with the predicted rank order, Q = пишЬег of pa i r s In the perceived rank order in discordance with 
the predicted rank order, and N a t o t a l number of p a i r s for which a rank order prediction was made. 
cTt\e perceived i n t e n s i t y rank orders for each basic emotion are presented in Table 1. 
with the perceived intensity rank order (т = .82). This indicates 
that all Action Units which can be signs of disgust, may also 
contribute to the intensity rating of disgust. 
DISCUSSION 
The Facial Action Coding System (FACS) of Ekman and Friesen 
(1978a) offers a reliable set of units to describe expressions of basic 
emotions as well as the intensity of expressions of these emotions. 
First, when FACS descriptions were used as instructions for posing 
42 
study 1 
facial expressions considered typical for basic emotion expres-
sions, it appeared possible for adult observers to infer reliably the 
intended basic emotion categories. This was found for both weak 
and more intense expressions. Moreover, the results confirmed the 
accuracy of most of the predictions about judgments of the 
emotions expressed in the varying combinations of facial Action 
Units. In addition to replicating previous findings (e.g., Bassili, 
1979; Camras, 1980; Ekman et al., 1980; Hiatt et al., 1979; Izard et 
al., 1980), the Action Units contributing to perceptions of shame 
and contempt were assessed. Although it is sometimes argued that 
head and eye movements are the most important signs of shame 
and contempt (Ekman & Oster, 1979, p. 531; Izard, 1977, p. 339 and 
386), the present study demonstrated that there are also facial 
movements characteristic of these emotions. 
Second, for each emotion, one or two Action Units on which 
most subjects based their intensity judgments could be isolated by 
testing intensity rank order predictions. Except for disgust, the 
higher the activity level of these one or two Action Units, the more 
intense the emotion was judged. Moreover, for all emotions but 
happiness and disgust, a perfect relation was obtained between the 
empirical mean intensity rank order and some of the predicted 
rank orders. Although evidence was weakest for happiness and dis-
gust, it still is consistent with Ekman et al. (1980). In their study, 
variation in the amount of facial actions prototypic for happiness 
(i.e., smiling) and for disgust (i.e., upper lip raising and nose 
wrinkling) was found to be associated with variation in the 
subjective experience of these emotions. 
Third, almost all confusions between predicted and other 
emotion categories could be explained from their shared Action 
Units. In other words, almost all confusions occurred in expres-
sions containing Action Units that are not unique to a particular 
emotion. Most confusions occurred in the predicted fear and anger 
expressions. Fear expressions appeared to be ambiguous when no 
brow raising was involved (i.e., confusions with anger and disgust), 
or when the lip stretching was too weak (i.e., confusions with 
surprise). Some anger expressions were ambiguous because one 
poser unintentionally added to the anger actions, a slight raising 
and drawing together of one brow, causing ambiguity between 
anger and fear. This brow action is sometimes considered as 
prototypic for the fear expression (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1978b). 
Unfortunately, we did not include this combination of raised and 
drawn-together brows in our fear expressions. 
Chapter I I 
In a few cases, observers judged differently two or more ex-
pressions of different posers, even though these were scored identi-
cally using FACS. Part of these differences may be accounted for 
by minor variations in the rate of onset and duration of the in-
volved facial Action Units (cf. Tomkins and McCarter's (1964) 
theory in which emotions are differentiated according to distinc-
tive features of rate and gradient of neural activation). We did not 
control for this possible effect. Also, some of the differences in 
judging identical expressions may be ascribed to "permanent" 
physiognomic characteristics of certain posers (Ekman, Note 1). 
These characteristics included whether each poser had a mustache 
or a beard, asymmetric, heavy or oblique brows, and normally 
wide-open eyes. Although FACS tries to accommodate the effect 
of such characteristics in its description of facial expressions by 
recommending starting every description with a neutral face, such 
permanent characteristics may nonetheless have some impact on 
observers' judgment of facial expressions. In order to assess 
whether such poser effects are systematic, a study is needed in 
which the same set of posers is used for each Action Unit 
combination. 
A widespread criticism on studies using pure forms of basic 
emotions, like the idealized poses in this study, concerns the gener-
alizability of results. It is argued that in real life, people will not 
express only one pure emotion; rather, they will express blends of 
two or more emotions at the same time. Also, there may be rapid 
fluctuations of different emotions within a short period of time. 
This criticism is not compelling, however, since it has been demon-
strated that FACS can also be used for measuring facial behavior 
which occurs in real life, including blends or rapid fluctuations of 
emotions (Ekman & Friesen, in preparation). Another argument 
against the generalizability of the present results might be that 
expressive behavior is often regulated by display rules according 
to which people may control their expression by suppressing its 
intensity or by masking it completely (Ekman et al., 1972, Ch. 4). 
However, FACS may also be used for discriminating real from 
masked emotional expressions. Based on preliminary evidence, 
Ekman and Friesen (1975, Ch. 11) suggested that thre are subtle 
facial behavior differences between actual emotional expressions 
and masks or other deceptive facial actions. Thus, using the 
present study's approach, FACS can also be used for studying the 
perception of more naturalistic emotions, including rapid 
fluctuations, blends, or masks of emotions. 
study 1 
Although this study was not designed to assess the effects of 
uniqueness and activity level of Action Units, some of the results 
indicated that the one or two Action Units that accounted most for 
the perceived intensity of an emotion, were also unique to the ex­
pression of that emotion. This implies that for each emotion, there 
are one or two distinctive facial actions on which observers base 
their emotion perception as well as their intensity estimation, all 
other nonunique facial actions being redundant. However, this 
could be demonstrated for some emotions only (e g., for happiness 
and shame), possibly because we did not manipulate independent­
ly activity level and uniqueness versus nonuniqueness of Action 
Units. More research in which these characteristics of Action Units 
are varied more systematically is needed to assess how the activity 
level of unique Action Units influences the perceived emotion 
intensity. 
In conclusion, the present study clearly demonstrated the de­
scriptive as well as predictive utility of FACS for studies on percep­
tion of emotions. Moreover, evidence regarding correspondence 
between Action Units and emotion expressions needs further 
elaboration using an approach like ours, in which other possible 
Action Units combinations are presented. 
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STUDY 2 
(submitted for publ ica t ion) 
Development of Recognition of Bnotions: Ch i ld ren ' s 
Reliance on S i t u a t i o n a l and Fac ia l Expressive Cues 
Michiel Wiggers and Cornells F. M. van Lieshout 
Abs t rac t . This study examined the inf luence of nondiscrepance 
and discrepance between s i t u a t i o n a l and express ive cues on 
c h i l d r e n ' s emotion r ecogn i t ion . Videotaped episodes in which 
a c t o r s portrayed emotions were presented to 4 - to 8-year-old 
g i r l s . When cues were nondiscrepant , g i r l s were b e t t e r a t a l l 
ages In recognizing happiness , f ea r , sadness , anger , and d i sgus t 
than shame and contempt. This was in t e rp re t ed as r e f l e c t i n g 
d i f fe rences in complexity of emotions. When cues were 
d i s c r e p a n t , g i r l s preferred cues depic t ing the most recognizable 
emotion, i . e . , cues of simple emotions in preference to cues of 
complex emotions, and emotional cues in preference to neu t r a l 
cues . Contrary to our expec ta t ions , they did not r e l y on more 
s a l i e n t cues in preference to l e s s s a l i e n t cues . G i r l s ' 
responses t o ques t ions regarding the perceived cues r e f l e c t ed a 
developmental t rend from not ic ing only one type of cue to con-
s ide r ing both types of cues . This was in t e rp re t ed as r e f l e c t i n g 
a development from cen t r a t ion to decen t r a t i on . 
Research on c h i l d r e n ' s emotion recogni t ion has shown an inc rease from 
3-9 years of age in the a b i l i t y t o recognize emotions, e i t h e r from 
f a c i a l express ions a lone ( e . g . , Izard , 1971; Odom & Lemond, 1972; 
Wiggers, 1977) or from a f f ec t i ve s i t u a t i o n s a lone ( e . g . , Borke, 1971; 
Gove & Keat ing, 1979). Studies i nves t i ga t i ng c h i l d r e n ' s r e l i a n c e on 
s i t u a t i o n a l and express ive cues in emotion r ecogn i t ion have r e s u l t e d 
in r a t h e r equivocal f i nd ings . Most of these s t u d i e s used discrepance 
between s i t u a t i o n a l and expressive cues ( e . g . , a boy frowning a t h i s 
b i r thday p a r t y ) . Some s t u d i e s r epo r t an increase with age in r e ly ing 
on express ive cues and a decrease in r e l y i n g on s i t u a t i o n a l cues 
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(Burns & Cavey, 1957; Gove & Keating, 1979; Greenspan, Barenboim, 4 
Chandler, 1976). In other studies, the opposite trend ( l ano t t i , 1978; 
Kurdek 4 Rodgon, 1975; Reichenbach 4 Masters, 1983) or no such trend 
(Deutsch, 1974; Greenspan, et a l . , 1976) was found. At least three 
factors can be mentioned which in our view considerably influence 
chi ldren 's reliance on cues but which were hardly considered in prior 
s tudies. The influence of these three factors on children's reliance 
on cues formed the f i r s t concern of the present study. 
F i r s t , chi ldren 's reliance on the type of cues may be influenced by 
the r e l i a b i l i t y of the cues as representative of a given emotion. In 
part icular , there may have been a problem with the expressive cœs in 
prior s tudies. Most of them used drawings of expressions which often 
do not represent real emotion expressions (see Scman, Friesen, Ь Ells­
worth, 1972, pp. 50-51). In studies in viiich real expressions were 
used (Deutsch, 1974; Greenspan, et a l . , 1976), no effort was made to 
avoid ambiguities in the facial expressive cues which often occur in 
such studies (see Ekman, et a l . , 1972). An exception i s a recent study 
(Reichenbach & Masters, 1983) in which expressions were selected on 
the basis of expert judges' ratings. 
Second, chi ldren's reliance on the type of cœs may be influenced 
by the re la t ive salience of si tuational and expressive cues. This may 
occur when the in tens i t ies of emotion depicted in each of the cues are 
different. For example, one of Burns and Cavey'3 (1957) pictures dep-
icted a boy with a weak smile on his face in a s i tuat ion representing 
a strong negative emotion (a doctor with a long needle in his hand). 
There may also be an effect of salience induced by the procedure used. 
For example, in familiarizing their subjects with the emotion labels , 
lanot t i (1978) and Kurdek and Rodgon (1975) used drawings of expres-
sions and thereby focused children's attention on the expressive cues. 
By asking children questions l ike 'What happened in the s tory? ' , 
Deutsch (1974) drew the i r attention more to the si tuational cues. All 
studies using narrative descriptions supported by picture series may 
have given more weight to the si tuational cues. 
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Third, chi ldren's reliance on the type of сиэз may be influsnced by 
the complexity of the emotions depicted in each of the cues. Most stu­
dies had materials representing simple emotions l ike happiness, fear, 
sadness, and anger in the s i tuation as well as in the facial expres­
sion. However, Greenspan et a l . (1976) used a 'mildly positive 
expression of amused nonchalance' which i s a rather complex emotion, 
together with a sad situation (losing a game), representing a mtch 
simpler emotion. The children's preference for s i tuational cues in 
their study may simply ref lect a preference for the less complex, and 
therefore most recognizable emotion. 
In a prior study (Wiggers, 1977), eight emotions were classified 
into three levels of complexity. These eight emotions are considered 
to be basic emotions because cross-cultural research has demonstrated 
the universality of their expressions (Ekman, e t a l . , 1972; Izard, 
1971). The emotions on the most complex level require integration of 
several s i tuat ional events and experiences, often separated in time, 
i . e . , shame and contempt. For example, shame involves simultaneous 
consideration of (a) a positive a t t i tude towards an act in the past, 
(b) a rule viiich has been violated by t h i s act, and (c) a resulting 
negative at t i tude towards this act in the present. As a resu l t , the 
self i s seen as inferior of others (cf. Izard, 1971, p . 326; Thrane, 
1979)· The less complex emotion of surprise i s conceived as being the 
result of an expectation bui l t up in the past which i s violated in the 
present. The emotions on the most simple level demand attention and 
reaction to only one event, e.g., the feeling of happiness when 
receiving a present. Similarly, fear, sadness, anger, and disgust can 
be conceived as simple emotions. Two studies in which expressions of 
these eight emotions were shown (Izard, 1971; Wiggers, 1977) report 
recognition ra tes in agreement with t h i s c lass i f icat ion in complexity. 
That i s , the simple emotions were recognized at an ear l ie r age than 
the more complex emotions. 
A second aim of the current study was to find out whether findings 
on children's reliance on the type of cues may be accounted for by the 
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Piagetian developmental processes of egocentrism-nonegocentrian and 
centration-decentration (Higgins, 198I). A reliance on situational 
cues i s often assumed to ref lect egocentrism, whereas a reliance on 
expressive cues indicates nonegocentrisa ( e .g . , Burns 4 Cavey, 1957; 
l ano t t i , 1975; Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975). In other words, egocentric 
children assune that another's emotion is similar to the emotion they 
themselves experience in that situation ( i . e . , projection), whereas 
nonegocentric children believe that another's true emotion i s indi-
cated by his/her expression. Centration may imply either egocentrism 
or nonegocentrism. That i s , centered children infer another's emotion 
by centering on either the situation ( i . e . , egocentrism) or on the 
expression ( i . e . , nonegocentrism), whichever i s more sal ient to them 
(cf. ítofflnan, 1977a, p . 297). Decentered children are able to simul-
taneously consider si tuational and expressive cues, including less 
sal ient cues. 
Neither of these developmental processes can fully account for the 
findings on children's reliance on the type of cues in prior s tudies. 
However, we believe that the val idi ty of these processes for 
children's emotion recognition cannot be assessed adequately by look-
ing at children's emotion inferences as si tuation or expression-
consistent. An emotion inference consistent with one type of cue does 
not exclude an ear l ier consideration of both types of cues. Other fac-
tors may also account for the reliance on one type of cue, e .g . , a 
ch i ld ' s awareness of display rules (cf. Saarni, 1979). Consequently, 
for an adequate evaluation of the val idi ty of the processes of 
egocentrism-nonegocentrian and centration-decentration, i t i s required 
to assess which cues were considered by the children, e .g . , by expli-
c i t l y asking for the cues perceived by them (cf. Hughes, Tingle, & 
Sawin, 1981). 
An experiment was conducted in which children had to infer the emo-
tions of actors in videotaped episodes. The episodes involved non-
discrepant as well as discrepant si tuational and expressive cues. To 
eliminate unreliable expressive cues, we relied on findings of an 
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earlier· study (Wiggers, 1982) in which facial expressive cues for 
eight emotions could be described using an independent descriptive 
frame of reference for facial expressions (Ekman Ь Friesen, 1978a). 
The use of nondiscrepant cues allowed us to evaluate the classif ica­
tion of emotions into three levels of complexity. Discrepant cues 
were included to determine the types of cuss on which children rely. 
To test for an effect of salience of cues, the intensity of emotion 
depicted in each of the cues was systematicly varied. To control for a 
procedure-indujed effect of cue-salience, both types of cues were 
shown on video. In addition, the questions asked aimed at both types 
of cues. To tes t for an effect of complexity of cues, discrepant cues 
depicting simple and complex emotions were included. Finally, the 
validity of the developmental processes of egocentrism-nonegocentrism 
and centration-decentration for children's emotion recognition was 
assessed by asking the children to report the cues which they per­
ceived. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects in the study, 96 g i r l s from the lower middle c lass, 
attended three elementary schools and associated kindergartens in the 
Netherlands. Tiere were 32 kindergartners (mean age 4.8 years; age 
range 4.3 - 5.1 years), 32 f i r s t graders (mean age 6.8 years; age 
range 6.0 - 7.10 years), and 32 third graders (mean age 8.10 years; 
age range 8.0 - 9-9 years). Only g i r l s were used because some studies 
reported sex differences in recognizing emotions (see Hoffman, 1977b; 
Hall, 1978). 
Materials 
The materials in th i s study were short videotaped episodes in which 
actors facially and/or s i tuationally portrayed happiness, fear, sad­
ness, anger, disgust, surprise, shame, and contempt. Also included 
were neutral facial expressions and s i tuat ions. 
Situations. In order to obtain s i tuations common for children, a 
51 
Chapter I I I 
ser ies of interviews with a groip of second graders was held, one 
interview session for each emotion. In the interviews, children were 
questioned about si tuations in which adul ts ' emotions are caused by 
chi ldren 's ac ts . Based on their answers, we developed tvro sets of 
eight emotional si tuations consisting of interactions between a 
father, a mother, and a child. In a f i r s t set , the si tuations 
involved a g i r l , a mother, with the father as the target-person. In a 
second se t , the si tuations involved a boy, a father, and the mother as 
the target-person. In addition, we made tvw variants for each si tua-
t ion, one representing weak emotional intensi ty, and one representing 
strong emotional intensity. An example i s a si tuation in which a boy 
breaks table-ware in washing up the dishes causing anger in his 
mother. In the weak emotional variant, the boy drops an ordinary cup 
on the floor, whereas in the strong emotional variant he drops a new, 
expensive tea-pot. 
Facial Expressions. A to ta l of 16 different emotional facial 
expressions were posed by the two target-persons according to detailed 
instructions about position of facial components based on Ekman and 
Friesen's (1976, 1978a) Facial Action Coding System (FACS). FACS d is -
tinguishes 44 facial Action Units, which are the minimal u i i t s that 
are anatomically separate and visually distinguishable. Any facial 
ac t iv i ty can be reliably described in terms of the particular Action 
Units which singly or in combination produced i t . The instructed 
facial expressions consisted of combinations of Action Units that were 
found to be characterist ic for expression of the emotions (Wiggers, 
1982). For each emotion, two facial expressions were instructed, one 
representing weak emotional intensity, and one representing strong 
emotional intensi ty. Intensity instructions were based on the 
act ivi ty of Action Units that were fomd to contribute most to the 
perceived intensity of the emotion (Wiggers, 1982). As an evalmtion, 
the videotaped facial expressions were coded using FACS by two trained 
coders. Intercoder r e l i ab i l i t y was assessed by conducting the FACS 
Final Test (Ekman and Friesen, 1978b, p . 140) which resulted in high 
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mean agreement ra t ios of .82 and .84. Based on both coders' scorings, 
i t was concluded that a l l facial expressions conformed to the instruc-
t ions. 
Conditions 
Videotaped si tuations and facial expressions were assigned to six 
conditions according to the nature of the cues involved. In three 
conditions, nondiscrepant cues were shown. F i r s t , the concordant 
condition consisted of combinations of si tuations and congrusnt facial 
expressions. Second, in the situation-only condition emotional si tua-
tions were shown while facial expressions were not v is ib le . Third, in 
the expression-only condition, emotional facial expressions were shown 
without preceding s i tuat ions . 
In another three conditions, discrepant cues were presented. 
Fi rs t , the discordant condition contained combinations of a si tuation 
and a facial expression referring to different emotions. We used 
happiness-contempt, fear-anger, sadness-happiness, anger-shame, 
disgust-fear, surprise-sadness, shame-disgust, and contempt-surprise 
combinations of s i tuat ions and facial expressions, respectively. 
Second, the neutral expression condition consisted of combinations of 
emotional si tuations with a neutral expression. Finally, the neutral 
situation condition contained combinations of emotional facial expres-
sions with a neutral s i tuat ion. 
In a l l conditions, episodes started with a freeze frame of the i n i -
t i a l situation during viiich some introductory comments were made about 
what the father, mother, and child were doing. Each episode also ended 
with a freeze frame. In situation-only episodes, the final freeze 
frame consisted of the l a s t frame of the situation in which the target 
person's face was not yet v is ib le . In a l l other episodes, the final 
freeze frame depicted the apex of the target person's facial expres-
sive reaction in close-up. 
Salience Manipulation 
Different saliences of si tuat ional and expressive cues were induced 
using the tvro si tuation and two expression in tens i t ies for each 
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emotion. In the concordant as well as the discordant condition, four 
salience levels resulted from a l l possible pairinçs of a weak and a 
strong emotional situation with a weak and strong emotional expres-
sion. In the situation-only and neutral expression condition, two 
salience levels were represented by the two situation intensi t ies for 
each emotion. In the expression-only and neutral situation condition, 
tvro salience levels were obtained using the two expression in tensi t ies 
for each emotion. 
Procedure 
Each g i r l was tested twice by a male experimenter in a private room 
at school. The interval between tvro sessions was about one week. In 
each session, a g i r l vas presented with 16 episodes, eight from each 
set of episodes. The episodes of each set were shown together in one 
block of eight episodes. In each block there were two concordant and 
two discordant episodes, whereas episodes from each of the other four 
conditions were represented once. The four blocks shown to each g i r l 
were composed in sash a way that each emotion was represented three 
times in the situation and three times in the expression across condi-
t ions. This resulted in 16 different blocks of eight episodes. The 
presentation order of conditions, blocks, and sessions was comterbal-
anced in each age group. 
Episodes were shown on a colour television monitor at about 2 m 
distance from the g i r l . The experimenter told each g i r l that she would 
be shown on television a nunber of very short films about a father, a 
mother, and their child, and that she would be asked a few questions 
about each film. 
Dependent Measures 
Responses. Three types of responses resulted from a series of four 
questions. Fi rs t , each g i r l had to give a free description of the 
father/mother's emotion at the end of each episode by answering the 
question, "How does the father/mother feel?" Second, each g i r l was 
asked again how the father/mother f e l t , but now she had to make a 
choice from three emotion labels supplied by the experimenter. In 
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concordant, situation-only, and expression-only episodes one label 
referred to the emotion portrayed whereas the other two did not. In 
discordant episodes one label referred to the emotion in the situa-
tion, another label to the emotion in the expression, and a third 
label to neither of them. In episodes involving a neutral situation or 
a neutral expression, there was one neutral label, another label 
referred to the emotion portrayed, and a third label referred to nei-
ther of them. For example, in episodes depictinç a neutral expression 
in a situation portraying anger, girls had to choose from angry, happy 
or just normal. The order of the three labels mentioned was random-
ized. Third, each girl had to give an explanation of her emotion 
choice by answering two questions: "How can you tell that the 
father/mother is (label chosen by the girl)?," and "How does it come 
about that the father/mother feels (label chosen by the girl)?" We 
considered these two questions as more appropriate than the often used 
question of 'why' viien asking for explanations. The question of why is 
ambiguous and may be interpreted as having the meaning of either our 
third or our fourth question (cf. Hughes, Tingle, Ь Sawin, 1981). 
This questioning procedure was practised at the beginning of each 
session. There were two practice trials for the kindergartners, and 
one practice trial for the first and third graders. Practice trials 
were repeated until the girl fully understood the questioning pro­
cedure. It turned out that most girls quickly understood the pro­
cedure. Two kindergartners and one first grader who failed to under­
stand the procedure after repeated presentation of practice trials 
were replaced by classmates. 
Scoring. One coda? scored all 96 girls' responses to the four 
questions. To assess scoring reliability for the free descriptions 
and explanations, a second coder scored a sample of 25% of these two 
responses in each age group. In this sample, all presentation orders, 
all blocks, and both sets of episodes were equally represented. 
Girls' free descriptions and choices were coded using similar scor­
ing procedures. Responses in nondiscrepant episodes (i.e., 
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concordant, situation-only, and expression-only episodes) were coded 
as to whether they were consistent with the emotion portrayed. 
Responses in discrepant episodes ( i . e . , discordant episodes and 
episodes involving a neutral expression or a neutral situation) were 
coded as to viiether they were consistent with the emotion of the 
situation or the expression. For example, a g i r l ' s response of "mother 
feels sad" when presented with an episode in viiich the mother smiles 
seeing her son carrying his arm in a s l ing, was coded as s i tuation-
consistent, whereas a response of "mother feels happy" vas coded as 
expression-consistent. The intercoder agreement for the free descripb 
tion scoring VOS .96 for both the nondiscrepant and the discrepant 
episodes. 
G i r l s ' explanations in a l l episodes were coded for whether refer­
ences to s i tuat ional cues, expressive cues, or both were involved. An 
additional coding was done for g i r l s ' references to both sets of cues 
in episodes in which one of the emotional cues was absent ( i . e . , 
situation-only and expression-only episodes, and episodes involving a 
neutral expression or a neutral s i tuat ion) . I t was assessed whether 
they were aware of the absence of one emotional cue or constrted a 
second emotional cue to f i t the existing emotional cue. An example i s 
a g i r l v*io chose surprise in an episode in which the father raised his 
eyebrows and opened his mouth while the family i s having linch and 
explained her choice as "he has a surprised face" (answer to question 
3) "but I don't know why because nothing happened" (answer to question 
Ц). This explanation was coded as ' re fers to both sets of CLKS and i s 
aware of the absence of the emotional s i tuat ional cues. ' A g i r l ' s 
explanation of "he has a surprised face" (answer to question 3) 
"because the g i r l doesn't eat properly" (answer to question 4) was 
coded as ' re fers to both sets of cues and construed a s i tuational сш 
to f i t the existing expressive cues. ' No additional coding was done 
when g i r l s simply described the neutral cues, e.g., "they are eating" 
in the example above. The intercoder agreement for the explanation 
scoring was .89. 
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Results 
No differences in g i r l s ' responses due to the tvro sets of episodes 
(one with a male, another with a female target-person) were expected. 
A ser ies of 51* x 2 - tes t s was done, of which only five resulted in a 
significant difference, indicating that sex of target-person in 
episodes had l i t t l e effect on g i r l s ' responses. Consequently, t h i s 
variable was not included in the remaining analyses. Free 
Descriptions and Choices Involving Mondiscrepant Cues: The Tnree 
Levels of Complexity of Emotion 
Table 1 summarizes g i r l s ' fVee descriptions and choices consistent 
with the emotional сиэз in the concordant, situation-only, and 
expression-only conditions in each age group. These data werç analyzed 
Table 1 
Number of Free Descriptions and Choices Consistent with the Emotion 
Stimuli in Conditions Involving Nondiscrepant Cues per Age Group 
Condition 
Concordant13 
Situation 
onlyc 
Expression 
only0 
Age 
4 
6 
8 
4 
6 
8 
4 
6 
θ 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
ha 
20 
26 
28 
7 
9 
11 
9 
12 
15 
Free с 
fe 
20 
21 
27 
7 
9 
11 
5 
Ц 
6 
sa 
19 
23 
25 
3 
8 
12 
8 
6 
10 
lescriptions 
an 
25 
28 
31 
8 
9 
11 
11 
12 
14 
di 
25 
29 
30 
6 
7 
10 
8 
10 
13 
Emotion 
su 
6 
10 
12 
0 
1 
2 
1 
4 
8 
sh 
2 
6 
15 
1 
2 
5 
1 
1 
3 
co 
1 
6 
9 
0 
3 
4 
1 
0 
2 
3timulia 
ha 
26 
29 
30 
9 
12 
15 
14 
15 
14 
fe 
22 
23 
22 
9 
10 
11 
9 
8 
7 
Choice: 
sa 
24 
28 
28 
5 
11 
14 
10 
8 
13 
an 
23 
29 
29 
10 
11 
13 
11 
12 
16 
di 
20 
30 
32 
8 
12 
16 
10 
11 
14 
I 
su 
19 
23 
31 
8 
13 
16 
10 
10 
14 
sh 
4 
13 
19 
2 
8 
8 
4 
6 
10 
co 
5 
6 
9 
2 
3 
4 
6 
5 
7 
ha : happiness, fe = fear, sa = sadness, an = anger, di = disgust, 
su = surprise, sh = shame, co = contempt. 
ь 
η : 32 for each emotion in each age group. 
η = 16 for each emotion in each age group. 
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to assess the class i f icat ion of emotions into three levels of complex­
i t y . Since no effect of salience of cues on the responses in these 
conditions were found, we collapsed across salience levels in these 
analyses. 
We tested with χ2 for differences between emotions in g i r l s ' 
responses. Sample sizes are indicated in Table 1. IViese te s t s 
yielded a significant effect of emotion on free descriptions (for a l l 
three conditions,x 2 [7] > 24.32, ρ < .001), as well as on choices (for 
the expression-only condition, x2[7] = 16.13, Ρ < .025, for the other 
two conditions, χ 2 [7] > 24.32, о < .001). In order to assess whether 
these effects of emotion represented the three levels of complexity of 
2 
emotion, we tested with X for differences between emotions on each 
level of complexity within each age group in a l l three conditions. 
That i s , we tested for differences among the five most simple emotions 
(happiness, fear, sadness, anger, and disgust), and for differences 
among the two most complex emotions (shame and contempt). Since 
surprise was the only emotion represented on the third level, we exam­
ined vrtiether g i r l s ' responses in surprise episodes differed frora their 
responses on the most simple and most complex level. There were no 
significant differences in any age groip responses among the five sim­
ple emotions nor among the tvro complex emotions. Furthermore, in 
surprise episodes, g i r l s ' free descriptions were more in agreement 
with the two complex emotions, whereas their choices were more in 
agreement with the five simple emotions (see Figure 1). These ana­
lyses indicate that differences between emotions in g i r l s ' responses 
were caused primarily because g i r l s were mush bet ter a t a l l age levels 
in recognizing the more simple emotions (including surprise when the 
lable was supplied) than in recognizing the more complex emotions 
(including surprise v*ien a label had to be generated). This i s i l l u s ­
trated in Figure 1. 
When test ing with χ2 for effects of age on g i r l s ' recognition of 
simple and more complex emotions, only four age-related increases were 
fomd. In the concordant condition, there were increases with age in 
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free descriptions and choices for the most complex emotions (χ 2 [ 2 ] ' з 
for the two responses were 17.08, ρ < -001, and 9·67, ρ < .01). In the 
situation-only condition, there were increases with age in free 
descriptions for the most complex emotions (x 2[2] = 6.40, £ < .05) and 
in choices for the five simple emotions (x 2[2] = 7.20, ρ < .05). 
Free Descriptions and Choices Involving Discrepant Cues: The Reliance 
on Si t iat ional and Expressive Cues 
Table 2 sunmarizes g i r l s ' free descriptions and choices in the 
discordant, neutral expression, and neutral s i tuat ion conditions, 
coded as situation-consistent or expression-consistent. The data in 
these conditions were analyzed for effects of salience of c íes and 
complexity of emotion. Excluded from these analyses were responses 
inconsistent with both cues. 
concordant condition 
situation-only condition 
expression-only condition 
Percentage 
Cue-
Consistent 
Free 
Descriptions 
Percentage 
Cue-
Consistent 
Choices 
0% 
\00» 
sot 
0« . 
Simple Qootions < > Surprise Emotions .
 M Complex Emotions 
Age in years 
Figire 1. Girls' free descriptions and choices consistent with nondiscrepant cues for the 
simple, surprise, and complex emotions as a function of age. 
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Salience of cues. Effects of salience were assessed by x2 derived 
from two-way contingency tables in which the coded responses were 
classified according to salience levels. In the discordant condition, 
girls' choices were significantly different for the four salience lev­
els (x2[3, η = 683] = 17.76, ρ < .001) whereas their free descriptions 
were not. In the neutral expression and neutral situation conditions, 
there were no significant differences between the two salience levels 
in free descriptions nor in choices. In order to test whether the 
effect of salience on choice responses reflected a tendency to rely on 
the more salient cues, we conducted a Chi-square decomposition 
analysis (Everitt, 1977; Meerling, 1980) on girls' choices in the 
discordant condition. This analysis revealed that salience signifi­
cantly affected the H-year-olds' choices (χ2[3, η = 212] = 17.65, £ < 
.001) but not the 6- and S-year-olds' choices. Hie 4-year-olds' 
choices were found to reflect a preference for the situational cues 
(67ί situation-consistent choices) when the situation had a different 
salience than the expression (i.e., either more or less salient), and 
a preference for the expressive cues (59% expression-consistent 
choices) when the situation was as salient as the expression (χ2[1, η 
= 212] = 14.21, ρ < .001). Thus, this effect of salience does not 
reflect a reliance on more salient cues. No satisfactory explanation 
can be given for this effect. In all, these results are contrary to 
our expectations, in that there was no tendency — at least not for 
the 6- and 8-year-olds — to rely on the more salient cues. 
Complexity of emotion. Chi-square analyses were carried out on the 
responses in the discrepant cue conditions to test for an effect of 
conplexity of emotion on girls' reliance on the type of cues. In 
these analyses, we distinguished between episodes involving both sim­
ple and more complex emotions, simple emotions only, and complex emo­
tions only. Sample sizes are indicated in Table 2. 
In the discordant condition, there were significant differences 
between situation-consistent and expression-consistent responses when 
both simple and complex anotions were involved, i.e., in situation-
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Table 2 
Number of Situation-Consistent and Expression-Consistent Free Descriptions and 
Choices in Conditions Involving Discrepant Cues per Ase Group 
Condition 
Оізсогаапі^ 
Neutral 
expression0 
Neutral 
situation0 
Age 
1 yrs 
6 yrs 
8 yrs 
4 yrs 
6 yrs 
8 yrs 
4 yrs 
6 yrs 
8 yrs 
Response 
consistent 
with 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
situation 
expression 
ha 
CO 
7 
1 
10 
2 
19 
2 
ha 
10 
0 
7 
0 
8 
0 
ha 
0 
β 
0 
11 
0 
13 
Free desc 
fe 
an 
7 
17 
10 
16 
12 
17 
fe 
3 
0 
8 
0 
11 
1 
fe 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
3 
sa 
ha 
4 
14 
10 
10 
12 
9 
за 
4 
2 
В 
0 
11 
0 
sa 
1 
2 
0 
5 
0 
1 
an 
3h 
14 
0 
io 
3 
9 
4 
an 
11 
0 
13 
0 
13 
0 
an 
0 
9 
0 
11 
0 
13 
¡riptions 
di 
fe 
12 
1 
15 
1 
17 
2 
dl 
2 
0 
7 
1 
6 
0 
di 
0 
7 
0 
9 
0 
9 
Emotion of 
su sh 
Emotio 
за 
1 
β 
1 
1 1 
6 
6 
dl 
0 
10 
0 
20 
1 
16 
CO 
in Of 
su 
3 
0 
2 
8 
4 
1 1 
Emotion of 
3U 
0 
0 
1 
2 
5 
0 
sh 
3 
1 
2 
0 
5 
0 
Emotio 
SU 
0 
2 
0 
5 
0 
8 
sh 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
CO 
1 
0 
4 
0 
3 
0 
η of 
CO 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Choices 
situation3 
ha 
expr 
CO 
17 
12 
23 
6 
24 
7 
fe 
•ess 
an 
22 
6 
22 
6 
17 
11 
sa an 
lion3 
ha sh 
10 19 
15 10 
20 18 
10 14 
20 18 
5 14 
situation* 
ha 
7 
8 
8 
6 
10 
5 
fe 
8 
6 
7 
2 
10 
4 
express 
ha 
5 
11 
3 
13 
3 
13 
fe 
8 
4 
3 
8 
3 
7 
sa an 
7 8 
6 7 
9 14 
1 1 
11 15 
1 1 
ilona 
sa an 
6 4 
8 β 
3 3 
8 13 
2 3 
6 13 
di 
fe 
22 
6 
30 
0 
31 
0 
di 
11 
2 
13 
0 
14 
0 
di 
1 
13 
1 
1 1 
3 
10 
su 
sa 
13 
14 
10 
21 
23 
9 
su 
6 
8 
5 
6 
9 
7 
su 
4 
7 
3 
12 
1 
12 
sh 
di 
5 
23 
3 
26 
6 
21 
ah 
2 
5 
5 
2 
9 
1 
sh 
10 
4 
4 
11 
6 
6 
co 
su 
8 
10 
9 
19 
3 
25 
co 
1 
11 
3 
8 
9 
__3 
co 
9 
4 
9 
5 
4 
10 
Note. Not Included are responses which were inconsistent with both cues. 
aha = happiness, fe = fear, sa = sadness, an = anger, di = disgust, su = surprise, 
sh = shame, co = contempt. 
b
n = 32 for each emotion pair in each age group. 
c
n = 16 for each emotion in each age group. 
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expression combinations of happiness-contempt, anger-shame, shame-
disgust, contempt-surprise, and surprise-sadness. Ihat is, in both 
free descriptions and choices girls relied more on the situation when 
the expression conveyed a more complex emotion (x2[1]'s for the two 
responses were 40.11 and 17.23, £ < .001), whereas their reliance on 
the expression was greater when the situation conveyed a more complex 
emotion (x2[1]'s for the two responses were 48.00 and 31·22, ρ < 
.001). When both types of cuss conveyed a simple emotion, girls 
relied in their choices more on the situation than on the expression 
(X2[1] = 72.03, ρ < .001), whereas no significant difference was found 
for their free descriptions. 
In the neutral expression and neutral situation conditions, girls' 
fVee descriptions reflected very few reliances on neutral cues, 
whereas there were relatively more reliances on cues depicting the 
five simple emotions than on cues depicting the three more complex 
emotions (X2[1]'s for the two conditions were 5.01 and 7.00, ρ < .05). 
Girls' choices in the two conditions reflected more reliances on emo­
tional cues than on neutral cues when the five simple emotions were 
depicted (x2 [1]'s for the tvro conditions were 52.26 and 45.82, £ < 
.001). In contrast, there were no significant differences between 
reliances on emotional and neutral cues when the three more complex 
emotions were depicted. 
We also tested for a differential influence of age on the reported 
effects of complexity of emotion. There was a significant age-effect 
on girls' choices when only simple cues were involved, in the discor­
dant condition (X [2] = 6.68, ρ < .05) and in the neutral expression 
condition (X2[2] = 9.00, £ < .02). This indicates that one of the 
above reported effects of complexity became more pronounced with age. 
The effect involved a preference in choices for situational cues- when 
both types of cues depicted simple emotions or when the situation dep­
icted a simple emotion and the expression was neutral. In addition, 
age was found to significantly affect girls' choices when only complex 
cuss were involved, in the neutral expression condition (X [2] = 
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ІЗ.8З, £ < .001) and in the neutral situation condition (x2[2] = 9.00, 
£ < .001). This indicates that when one type of cue was neutral and 
the other type depicted a complex emotion, the younçer girls' choices 
were more in agreement with the neutral cue, whereas the older girls 
chose more in accordance with the emotional cue. The latter effects of 
age clarify why no differences were found in the corresponding 
analysis across age groups. All other effects involving complexity of 
emotion were fomd to be independent of age. 
In all, these analyses indicate that a great deal of the variabil-
ity in girls' reliance on the type of cues can be accounted for by 
differences in complexity of the emotions depicted in the cues. That 
is, girls were found to rely on cues depicting зілріе emotions rather 
than on cues depicting more complex emotions or no emotion (neutral 
cues). 
Explanations: Developmental Processes of Egocentriam-Nonegocentrian 
and Centration-Decentration 
Table 3 summarizes girls' explanations coded as containing refer­
ences to situational cues alone, to expressive cues alone, or to both 
types of cues, for each age group in each condition. These data were 
analyzed to search for age-related effects reflecting the processes of 
egocentrism-nonegocentrism and centration-decentration. 
In each condition, a Chi-square decomposition analysis was applied 
to a two-way contingency table involving the coded explanations in 
three age groups. Sample sizes are indicated in Table 3. Age was 
fotfid to significantly affect the explanations in all conditions (all 
9 
X [ O ' s > ІЗ.82, £ < .001). The chi-square decompositions revealed an 
age-related shift in explanations which was similar in a l l conditions. 
That i s , from 4 to 6 but not from 6 to 8 years of age, there was a 
decrease in explanations containing only one type of cue and an 
increase in explanations containing both types of cues ( a l l x 2 [ 1 ] ' s > 
ІО.83, £ < .001). This tendency clearly ref lec ts a developmental trend 
from centering on only one type of cue to a decentered consideration 
of both types of cues. Moreover, no evidence was found for a develop-
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Table 3 
Number of Eicplanations Containing Only Situational Cues, Only 
Expressive Cues, or Both per Age Group in Each Condition 
Condition 
Concordant3 
Situation 
onlyb 
Expression 
only" 
Discordant3 
Neutral 
expression1 
Neutral 
situation11 
Age 
4 
6 
θ 
14 
6 
3 
4 
6 
β 
II 
6 
β 
4 
6 
β 
4 
6 
8 
yrs 
yra 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
yrs 
Cu 
Only si 
es re 
tuatl 
ТЧ 
11 
21 
69 
43 
51 
20 
0 
4 
71 
17 
22 
42 
14 
16 
23 
5 
9 
ferred 
onal 
to il 
Only 
η explana 
expressi 
20 
2 
1 
3 
0 
1 
45 
14 
a 
23 
2 
0 
9 
4 
0 
3i 
13 
5 
tlon 
ve Both 
154 
240 
234 
43 
85 
76 
53 
114 
116 
151 
237 
234 
68 
110 
112 
65 
110 
114 
Note. Not Included are nonsense or no explanations given by 
the 4-year-old3. 
aNuinber of observations In each age group Is 256. 
Number of observations in each age group is 128. 
mental trend from egocentric centering on situational cues to nonego-
centric centering on expressive cues. 
Table 4 presents a further specification of how the girls in each 
age group referred to both types of cues in the four conditions in 
which one of the emotional cues was absent. IViat is, if possible it 
was determined for the situation-only, expression-only, neutral 
expression, and neutral condition whether the girls indicated to be 
aware of the absence of one emotional cue or construed a second emo-
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Table 4 
Girls' References to Absent Emotional Cues in the 
Explanations Containing Both Situational and 
Expressive Cues per Age Group 
Condition 
Situation 
only 
Expression 
only 
Neutral 
expression 
Neutral 
situation 
К 
6 
8 
η 
6 
β 
Ч 
6 
8 
Ч 
6 
8 
Не 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
угз 
Re 
We 
an 
ference 
re aware 
absent 
Τ 
28 
46 
12 
43 
62 
6 
Ч 
19 
5 
8 
26 
to absent 
! of 
cue 
emotional cues 
Construed a 
second cue 
36 
57 
30 
41 
71 
54 
39 
83 
84 
15 
20 
19 
Note. Not included are girls' references to neutral 
cues. Consequently} cell sums do not always equal the 
number of references to both cues reported in Table 2. 
t ional cue to f i t the existing emotional cue. Chi-square analyses on 
these codings for three age groups yielded significant age differences 
in a l l four conditions (x 2 [2] ' s were 25.27, £ < .001, 15.20, ρ < .001, 
8.38, £ < .02, and 8.98, ρ < .02). Sample sizes are indicated in 
Table 4. The Chi-square decompositions revealed that in a l l four con­
dit ions, the 8-year-olds gave more explanations reflecting awareness 
of the absent emotional cues than the 4- and 6-year-olds ( x 2 [ 1 ] ' s were 
21.93, Ρ < .001, 11.88, £ < .001, 6.32, ρ < .02, and 8.98, ρ < .001). 
In a l l , these analyses showed that with age the explanations became 
more accurate. The oldest g i r l s ' explanations corresponded most 
closely to the presence of the emotional cues in the episodes. The 
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younger girls gave more explanations that were incomplete, i.e., 
referring to only one type of cue when two types were available, as 
well as more explanations that were incorrect, i.e., references to 
both types of cues when only one was available by construing a second 
emotional cue. 
Discussion 
A number of conclusions concerning the role of situational and 
expressive cues in children's emotion recognition can be drawn from 
the above findings. First, when situational and/or expressive cues 
were reliable, i.e., representative of one particular emotion, and 
girls were familiar with the emotion, a majority of girls at all age 
levels were able to recognize the emotion. Thereby, an independent 
descriptive system like Bcman and Friesen's (1978a) Facial Action Cod-
ing System is useful to obtain reliable facial expressive cues (cf. 
Wiggers, 1982). 
Second, the hypothesized classification of emotions according to 
their complexity was supported for the most part by the recognizabil-
ity of the various emotions. That is, girls were m œ h more familiar 
at all age levels with simple emotions such as happiness, fear, sad-
ness, anger, and disgust than with more complex emotions like 
surprise, shame, and contempt. This finding is consistent with past 
studies (Izard, 1971; Wiggers, 1977). The difference between surprise 
and simple emotions was eliminated in our study when the surprise 
label vas supplied. However, it does not seen reasonable to consider 
all differences between recognizability of simple and complex emotions 
as reflecting girls' inability to generate labels of complex emotions. 
Most girls still could not recognize shame and contempt when labels 
were supplied. Therefore, a more plausible interpretation of girls' 
inability to recognize complex emotions is to assume that children of 
these ages are still unable to conceive the complexity of emotions 
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like shame and contempt rather than merely being unable to understand 
the verbal labels. 
Third, most of girls' reliances on situational and expressive cues 
when there was discrepance between the cues did not reflect a prefer­
ence for either type of cue, as is sometimes assuned (Burns & Cavey, 
1957; lanotti, 1975; Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975). Instead, girls preferred 
cues depicting the most recognizable emotion, regardless of the type 
of cuss. That is, they relied (a) on the cues depicting the more sim­
ple emotions in preference to cues depicting more complex emotions, 
and (b) on the emotional cues in preference to neutral cues. Tne 
latter effect is consistent with findings reported by Reichenbach and 
Masters (1983). Consistent with the former effect is the finding in 
Greenspan et al.'s (1976) study that children preferred the situation 
in which a much simpler emotion was depicted than in the expression, 
аз was outlined before. A third effect was that girls relied more on 
the situational cues when both types of cœs depicted simple emotions, 
but only when labels were supplied. This result is consistent with 
findings reported by lanotti (1978) and Kurdek and Rodgon (1975). 
However, the finding that this preference for the situation became 
more pronomced with age indicates that this effect does not reflect 
egocentrism, as is assumed in these studies. Rather, this effect 
reflects girls' awareness that the emotions a person feels need not 
necessarily to be expressed overtly, but may be masked by another emo-
tion (cf. Saarni, 1979). Finally, in contrast with our expectations 
there was no stronger reliance on cues representing more intense emo-
tions in preference to cues representing less intense emotions. In 
other words, most girls were as able to rely on less salient as on 
highly salient cues, even when the cues were discrepant. However, 
this does not exclude that procedures used in prior studies induced an 
effect of salience of cues, e.g., due to the questions raised 
(Deutsch, 1974) or the stimulus materials used (lanotti, 1978; Kurdek 
& Rodgon, 1975; Reichenbach & Masters, 1983). 
Fourth, the preferences for specific cues do not imply that the 
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nonpreferred cues were totally ignored by the girls. On the contrary, 
many girls noticed the presence of both types of cues when asked to 
report the perceived cues. This suggests that their preference for 
cues results from giving more weight to one type of cue in their emo-
tion inferences. These findings confirm our assumption that the 
developmental processes of egocentrism-nonegocentrism and centration-
decentration cannot be evaluated adequately by only examining the emo-
tion inferences, as was sometimes done in past studies (Burns & Cavey, 
1957; Greenspan et al., 1976; Kurdelc & Rodgon, 1978). Rather, an 
asessment of the cues perceived by the children is required. In our 
study, we found evidence for a clear developmental trend from centra-
tion to decentration, i.e., from noticing only one type of cue to con-
sidering both types of cues. When only one type of cue was noticed, 
girls could be either egocentric in that they referred to the situa-
tional cues, or nonegocentric in that they referred to the expressive 
cues. However, there was no support for a development from an egocen-
tric to a nonegocentric attention to cues. For girls who perceived 
both types of cues another developmental trend was found. Their refer-
ences to both types of cues became more accurate with age as indicated 
by an increased awareness of the presence and absence of emotional 
cues in the episodes. 
In conclusion, in further research using nondiscrepant cues, the 
age range should be extended to determine the age at which children 
are better able to recognize the complex emotions of shame and con-
tempt. Fbrther research using discrepant cues needs to be done in 
which the three effects for the reliance on cues reported in our 
study, are examined in a more systematic way, e.g., by using all pos-
sible pairings of the emotions in the situation and expression. 
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STUDY 3 
(International Journal of Behavioral Development, in press) 
FEMALE PRESCHOOLERS' VERBAL AND NONVERBAL 
EMPATHIC RESPONSES TO EMOTIONAL SITUATIONS AND 
FACIAL EXPRESSIONS * 
Michiel WIGGERS and Henk WILLEMS 
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Accepted March 1983 
Several conceptualizations about the interdependency of three empathy responses during the 
empathie arousal process in children were contrasted, i.e., understanding, sharing, and facially 
expressing another's affect (cognitive, affective, and facial empathy, respectively). Videotaped 
episodes in which actors portrayed happiness, fear, sadness, and anger were presented to five-year-
old girls in three conditions, 16 girls in each condition In a first condition, emotions were 
conveyed by the actor's facial expressions, in a second condition by situational events, and in a 
third condition by both situational events and facial expressions. Girls' affective and cognitive 
empathy was assessed by asking questions about girls' own feelings and the actor's feelings. 
respectively. Girls' facial empathy was measured with Ekman and Fnesen's Facial Action Coding 
System Results corroborated an empathy conceptualization in which affective and facial empathy 
are mediated by cognitive empathy. An empathy conceptualization in which cognitive and affective 
empathy are aroused by afferent feedback of involuntary facial empathy was not supported by the 
results. 
In studies on empathy in children, empathy has been conceptualized in 
.different and, in some cases, even conflicting ways (for reviews, see 
Deutsch and Madie 1975; Smither 1977). More specifically, empathy 
has been conceived as solely cognitive understanding of another person's 
affect, i.e., cognitive empathy (e.g., Borke 1971); or as a sharing of 
* This study forms part of a research project on development of recognition of emotion, financially 
supported by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O. grant 
56-103). The present manuscript is based on a Master's thesis of the second author. The authors 
would like to thank Cornells F.M. van Lieshout, Peter G. Heymans, Tamara J. Ferguson, and 
Michael Katzko for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Thanks are extended 
also to the actors, coders, and children who participated in this study. 
Requests for reprints should be sent to M. Wiggers, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 
Psychologisch Laboratorium, Ontwikkelingspsychologie, Postbus 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. 
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another person's affect, i.e., affective empathy (e.g., Feshbach and Roe 
1968); or as an isomorphic, presumably unlearned motor mimicry 
response to another person's expression of affect, i.e., facial empathy 
(Lipps 1935). The present study investigates the interdependency of 
different empathie responses (i.e., cognitive, affective, and facial em-
pathie responses) in the empathie arousal process. 
One of the earliest conceptualizations of empathy was given by Lipps 
(1926, 1935) who considered empathy as to be aroused by involuntary 
motor mimicry and afferent feedback. That is, upon perceiving another 
person, the observer automatically imitates the other person's posture 
and facial expression (i.e., motor mimicry). Afferent feedback of muscle 
activity leads to the observer's understanding and shared experience of 
the other person's affect. In Lipps' view, both cognitive and affective 
empathy are directly aroused by motor mimicry and afferent feedback. 
More recently, Hoffman (1978) defined empathy as a largely involun-
tary vicarious response to affective cues from another person or from 
his situation. In agreement with Lipps, Hoffman considered motor 
mimicry and afferent feedback as one of the possible mechanisms 
leading to empathie arousal. Until now, no direct evidence for the 
occurrence of motor mimicry and afferent feedback is available. How-
ever, there is some indirect but incomplete evidence for the occurrence 
of either facial motor mimicry alone or afferent facial feedback alone. 
Some support for the occurrence of facial motor mimicry stems from 
studies in which adult observers were able to infer from a subject's 
facial expression at what emotion-eliciting situation the subject was 
looking, using as subjects both children (Buck 1975, 1977; Hamilton 
1973) and adults (Fujita et al. 1980). However, because it was not clear 
from these studies to which cues - facial and/or situational - subjects 
were responding facially, we cannot conclude whether facial motor 
mimicry was occurring in these studies. 
Some evidence for afferent facial feedback was found in studies 
using manipulated facial expressions. That is, adult subjects were 
instructed to move their facial muscles in certain positions (e.g., a 
frown, smile, neutral face) and then to report the feelings they were 
experiencing. Reported feelings of anger, happiness, and humorous 
feelings (Duncan and Laird 1977; Laird 1974; McArthur et al. 1980), 
and feelings of pain (Lanzetta et al. 1976) appeared to be influenced, at 
least in intensity, by the manipulated facial expressions. Contrary to the 
latter findings, Tourangeau and Ellsworth (1979), also using facial 
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manipulations, failed to show that emotional expressions were suffi­
cient or necessary for the self-reported emotion 
A different conceptualization of empathy was given by Feshbach 
(1975) who proposed a model of empathy involving both cognitive and 
affective elements In this model, affective empathy is mediated by 
cognitive understanding This point of view contradicts Lipp's view of 
direct arousal of affective empathy by motor mimicry and afferent 
feedback without mediating cognitive understanding. Support for 
Feshbach's model came from studies in which it was found that in 
children, cognitive empathie understanding was a necessary but non-
sufficient prerequisite for the experience of affective empathy (Fesh­
bach and Roe 1968, Mood et al. 1978). However, considering the 
empathy-arousing stimulus materials used in these studies, it is not very 
likely that empathy could have been aroused by motor mimicry and 
afferent feedback. Their materials consisted of still drawings (Mood et 
al.) or slides (Feshbach and Roe) instead of moving pictures Further­
more, Mood et al used Borke's (1971) material шл ЬісЬ the story-child 
had a blank face. 
Each of the two empathy conceptualizations presented above leads to 
different predictions concerning the empathie arousal process in 
children For empathy viewed as being aroused by involuntary motor 
mimicry and afferent feedback, the following two hypotheses should 
hold. 
Hypothesis 1 · Perception of facial expressive cues in the other person 
leads to an empathie facial response, whereas when no facial expres­
sive cues are perceived, e.g., with only situational cues present, no 
facial empathie response occurs. 
This hypothesized link between the perceived expression and the per-
ceiver's expression involves the operation of involuntary facial motor 
mimicry. A second hypothesis follows from the operation of afferent 
facial feedback. 
Hypothesis 2· A facial empathie response is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for both cognitive empathie understanding and the experi­
ence of affective empathy. 
Based on the view of empathy in which affective empathy is mediated 
by cognitive empathie understanding, the following hypothesis should 
hold. 
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Hypothesis 3. Independent of the cues involved, cognitive empathie 
understanding is a necessary but non-sufficient condition for the 
experience of affective empathy. 
In the present study, these hypotheses were tested by measuring in 
three conditions three types of empathie responses The three types of 
empathie responses involved nonverbal facial empathie responses as an 
index for motor mimicry, verbal affective empathie responses as an 
index for the experience of affective empathy, and verbal cognitive 
empathie responses as an index for cognitive empathie understanding 
In the three conditions, different types of emotional cues were repre­
sented, ι е., facial expressive cues, situational cues, and both types of 
cues combined. In the conditions, 5-year-olds were presented with 
emotional cues depicting happiness, fear, sadness or anger. Previous 
research has shown that by the age of 4 to 5 years, children are familiar 
with these four emotions in affective situations (e.g, Borke 1971) or on 
facial expressions (eg., Izard 1971). Our hypotheses all concerned the 
interdependency of the three empathie responses in the empathie arousal 
process in children independent of any developmental process. We 
focused on preschool children in our study because from this age on, all 
three empathie responses may play a role in the empathie arousal 
process. In addition, an involuntary arousal of empathy is more likely 
in preschool children than in older children or in adults (Hoffman 
1978). Finally, since girls have been found to be more empathie than 
boys in some studies (Hoffman 1977), we used only girls in our study. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 48 lower middle class female kindergartners between 4.4 
and 6 8 years of age Girls were assigned randomly to three conditions 
resulting in 16 girls in each condition. The mean age in each condition 
was 5.7 years. 
Materials 
The empathy stimulus materials were short videotaped episodes in 
which actors facially and/or situationally portrayed happiness, fear, 
sadness, and anger. Each episode lasted about one minute. 
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Table 1 
Action Units characteristic for expression of happiness, fear, sadness, and anger. 
Emotion 
Happiness 
Fear 
Sadness 
Anger 
Action Units 
12 
(1 + 2) 
(1 + 2 + 4) 
5 
20 
(1+4) 
7 
15 
4 
(4 + 5) 
23 
24 
Description of Action Units 
12 = Lip corner pull 
1 -= Inner brow raise 
2 -= Outer brow raise 
4 = Brow lower 
5 = Upper eyelid raise 
20 - Lip stretch 
1 — Inner brow raise 
4 = Brow lower 
7 = Lids tight 
15 = Lip corner depress 
4 = Brow lower 
5 - Upper eyelid raise 
23 - Lip tight 
24 = Lip press 
Situations 
The situations consisted of events common for children, i.e., interac-
tions between a father, a mother, and a child. Examples are a son 
showing a phony mouse to his mother who then showed fear, or a 
daughter giving a present to her father who then showed happiness. The 
situations were portrayed using two different families. In the first 
family (father, mother, daughter) the father was the target-person, and 
in the second family (father, mother, son) the mother was the target-
person. Each emotion was represented by two different situations. As a 
validation, 20 female adult judges were asked to classify the eight 
situations into the four emotion categories. The interjudge agreement 
for the happiness, fear, sadness, and anger situations was 100%, 70%, 
95% and 100%, respectively. 
Facial expressions 
The four facial expressions were posed by the two actors according 
to detailed instructions about position of facial components based on 
Ekman and Friesen's (1976, 1978a) Facial Action Coding System 
(FACS). FACS distinguishes 44 facial Action Units, which are the 
minimal units that are anatomically separate and visually distinguisha-
ble. Any facial activity can be reliably described in terms of the 
particular Action Units which single or in combination produced it. 
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The instructed facial expressions consisted of combinations of Action 
Units that were found to be characteristic for expression of each of the 
four emotions (Wiggers 1982, see table 1). 
In order to make certain that the actors performed the facial expres-
sions as instructed, two FACS-trained coders independently applied 
FACS to the eight videotaped facial expressions of the actors Both 
coders had completed the FACS Final Test (Ekman and Friesen 1978b· 
140) with satisfactory mean agreement ratios of 0.82 and 0 84 Based on 
their FACS-scormgs, it was concluded that all videotaped facial expres-
sions contained the instructed Action Units as outlined in table 1 
Conditions 
Videotaped episodes were assigned to three conditions according to the 
nature of emotional cues involved In each condition, each of the four 
emotions was expressed once by the father of the first family and once 
by the mother of the second family, resulting in eight episodes in each 
condition In the expression condition, only a close-up of the facial 
expression of each episode was presented, which was frozen for 20 
seconds at the apex of the expression, as determined with FACS. In the 
situation condition, each emotion was portrayed in the situation only. 
In this condition, the last frame before the onset of the facial expression 
was frozen for 20 seconds. In the expression-plus-situation condition, 
which was a combination of the first two conditions, the emotional 
situation as well as the father/mother's facial expressive reactions were 
shown. As in the first condition, the close-up of the facial expression 
was frozen at the apex at the very end of the episode. 
Procedure 
In each of three conditions, eight girls were presented with four 
episodes in which the father was the target-person, and eight girls with 
four episodes in which the mother was the target-person. The order of 
presentation was counterbalanced. Each girl was tested alone by a male 
experimenter (HW) m a private room at her school. Episodes were 
shown on a colour television monitor at about 2m distance from the 
girl. The girl's facial expressive reaction just before and during the 
frozen frame of each episode was videotaped using a camera located 
beside the monitor. From questioning afterwards it appeared that the 
girls were not aware of being filmed. 
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Before the presentation of the episodes, a girl was instructed that 
episodes would be presented on a television monitor, in which a 
father/mother would feel one of four emotions of happiness, fear, 
sadness and anger. It was stressed that she had to pay special attention 
to the father/mother. Ten seconds after the frame was frozen in each 
episode, two questions were posed (the order was counterbalanced): 
"How does the father/mother feel?", and "How do you feel?". Each 
testing session lasted about 10 minutes. 
Scoring 
Facial empathie responses 
Girls' videotaped facial expressive reactions to the episodes were 
measured applying FACS. One coder (HW) scored the first 10 seconds 
of each girl's facial activity. A second coder scored a sample of 12 girls' 
facial activity consisting of one reaction to each emotion in each 
condition. A third coder (MW) scored a second sample of seven girls' 
facial activity, randomly selected from the first sample. Coders were 
blind to conditions and emotions from which the facial reactions were 
selected. Agreement ratios (see Ekman and Friesen 1978b: 24) were 
calculated for each reaction scored by two or three coders. For the three 
coder pairs, the mean ratios across the scored reactions were 0.87, 0.84 
and 0.82, respectively. 
The Action Units scored by the first coder were compared to the 
Action Units characteristic for expression of each of the four emotions 
as outlined in table 1. A girl's facial reaction that contained one or 
more Action Units in accordance with Action Units characteristic for 
the emotion in the episode, was considered to be a facial empathie 
response. In that case a score of 1 was given, while in all other cases a 
score of 0 was given. 
Cognitive empathie responses 
Verbal cognitive empathie responses (i.e., answers to the question: 
"How does the father/mother feel?") were scored using Borke's (1971) 
procedure. A girl received a score of 1 for an exact identification of the 
emotion in the episode, and a score of 0 if she could not correctly 
identify the emotion. 
Affective empathie responses 
Verbal affective empathie responses (i.e., answers to the question: 
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" How do you feel?") were scored using a procedure similar to Feshbach 
and Roe's (1968) specific matching procedure. A score of 1 was given if 
the emotion mentioned in the answer was a specific match with the 
emotion in the episode. If not, a score of 0 was given. 
Results 
Each of the three empathie responses appeared to have occurred 
independently of the sex of the target-person, i.e., the father and the 
mother (for all three empathie responses, χ 2 (1) < 3.75, ρ > 0.05). There­
fore, in the remaining analyses, the scores for the male and female 
target-person were not considered separately. The incidence of facial, 
affective, and cognitive empathie responses for each emotion in each 
condition is summarized in table 2. 
As can be seen in table 2, there occurred nine facial empathie 
responses in the situation condition, which is not in accordance with 
hypothesis 1. However, there seems to occur more facial empathie 
responses in the two conditions involving facial expressive cues than in 
Table 2 
Frequency of facial, affeclive, and cognitive empathie responses to four emotion stimuli in three 
conditions. 
Condition " 
Situation 
Expression 
Expression 
plus situation 
Emotion 
stimulus 
Happiness 
Anger 
Fear 
Sadness 
Happiness 
Anger 
Fear 
Sadness 
Happiness 
Anger 
Fear 
Sadness 
Empathie 
Facial 
2 
5 
2 
0 
12 
9 
7 
1 
9 
6 
7 
1 
responses 
Affective 
6 
0 
0 
1 
12 
3 
2 
4 
5 
3 
3 
2 
Cognitive 
11 
12 
11 
8 
16 
12 
7 
11 
16 
IS 
14 
12 
* л —16 for each emotion stimulus in each condition. 
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the situation condition. This was tested applying a Chi-square decom­
position analysis (Everitt 1977; Meerling 1980) to a three-way con­
tingency table, in which the facial empathie responses were classified 
according to occurrence of facial empathie response (0 or 1), condition 
(situation, expression, expression-plus-situation), and emotion (happi­
ness, anger, and fear). Since the incidence of facial empathie sadness 
responses was very low (i.e., only two responses occurred), these were 
excluded from this analysis. First, occurrence of facial empathie re­
sponses appeared to be independent of emotion within each condition 
(in all three conditions, χ 2 (2) < 3.80, ρ > 0.10). This allowed us to 
collapse across emotion, reducing the contingency table from three-way 
to two-way. Second, occurrence of facial empathie responses appeared 
to be dependent on condition (χ 2 (2) = 16.26, ρ < 0.001). Third, occur­
rence of facial empathie responses appeared to be independent of the 
conditions involving facial expressive cues, i.e., the expression and 
expression-plus-situation condition (χ 2 (1)=1.50, п.s), but related to 
condition when contrasting the situation condition with the expression 
and expression-plus-situation conditions combined (χ 2 (1) = 14.72, φ = 
0.32, ρ < 0.001). In conclusion, occurrence of facial empathie responses 
is related to condition in such a way that more facial empathie 
responses occurred when facial expressive cues were present, and less 
facial empathie responses when only situational cues were shown. 
However, this conclusion could not be tested in the sadness stimuli. 
In our analysis thus far, we did not test the part of hypothesis 1 in 
which it was stated that perception of facial expressive cues is required 
for a facial empathie response to occur. This was tested in a 2 x 2 
contingency table in which the cognitive and facial empathie responses 
were classified according to their occurrence (0 or 1) in the expression 
condition (see table 3). In the expression condition, occurrence of a 
cognitive empathie response can be considered as an index for percep­
tion of the facial expressive cues. According to table 3, there are 46 
instances in which facial expressive cues were perceived as indicated by 
the occurrence of a cognitive empathie response. However, no facial 
empathie response occurred in 23 of these 46 instances. In these 23 
instances, all four emotions were represented. In sum, there appeared to 
be evidence against involuntary facial motor mimicry. 
For the testing of hypotheses 2 and 3, the empathie response scores 
were classified in a three-way contingency table (see table 4) according 
to occurrence of affective empathie response (0 or 1), occurrence of 
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Table 3 
Contingency table for the co-occurrence of cognitive and facial empathie responses in the 
expression condition. 
Facial empathie response 
0 1 
Cognitive empathie response 
0 12 6 
1 23 23 
facial empathie response (0 or 1), and occurrence of cognitive empathie 
response (0 or 1). Hypothesis 2 states that a facial empathie response is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for both a cognitive and affective 
empathie response. However, as can be seen in the bottom row of table 
4, there are 43 instances in which a facial but no affective empathie 
response occurred, i.e., the hypothesized conditional sufficiency is 
violated. Moreover, there are 20 instances in which both a cognitive and 
an affective empathie response but no facial empathie response oc-
curred, i.e., the hypothesized conditional necessity is also violated. Both 
types of violation were represented in all four emotions as well as in all 
three conditions. In sum, there is no support for hypothesis 2, i.e., no 
evidence for afferent facial feedback. In fact, our results are contrary to 
hypothesis 2. The data in table 4 suggest a conditional relation between 
the cognitive empathie response and the facial empathie response in 
which the former is a necessary but non-sufficient condition for the 
latter. The necessity of the cognitive empathie response is violated in a 
low number of nine instances (i.e., 4.7%) in which a facial but no 
Table 4 
Contingency table for the co-occurrence of cognitive, affective, and facial empathie responses. 
Affective empathie response 
0 1 
Facial empathie response 
0 1 0 1 
Cognitive empathie response 
0 35 9 3 0 
1 73 34 20 18 
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cognitive empathie response occurred. The high number of 93 instances 
in which a cognitive but no facial empathie response occurred, reflects 
the non-sufficiency of the cognitive empathie response. 
Table 4 shows moderate support for hypothesis 3 which states that a 
cognitive empathie response is a necessary but non-sufficient condition 
for an affective empathie response. The hypothesized conditional 
necessity is violated in a low number of three instances (i.e., 1.6%) when 
an affective but no cognitive empathie response occurred. The hy-
pothesized non-sufficiency occurs in 107 instances in which a cognitive 
but no affective empathie response was present. Such instances oc-
curred in each of the three conditions with each of the foyr emotions. 
In conclusion, our data only confirmed our third hypothesis about the 
conditional relation between the cognitive and affective empathie re-
sponse. 
Discussion 
The results of this study clarify the role of different empathie responses 
in the empathie arousal process in five-year-old girls. First, cognitive 
empathie understanding was found to be a necessary but non-sufficient 
prerequisite for the experience of affective empathy as assessed by the 
girls' verbal responses. This finding is consistent with Feshbach's (1975) 
model of empathy in which affective empathy is mediated by cognitive 
empathie understanding. Second, facial empathie responses also ap-
peared to be mediated by cognitive empathie understanding. Third, in a 
large number of instances, facial empathie responses led to neither 
cognitive empathie understanding nor to the experience of affective 
empathy. The latter two results were interpreted as evidence against the 
operation of afferent facial feedback in the empathie arousal process as 
hypothesized by Lipps (1926, 1935) and Hoffman (1978). Our results 
confirmed the conclusion by Tourangeau and Ellsworth (1979) that 
emotional expressions were neither sufficient nor necessary for the 
self-reported emotion. Fourth, facial empathie responses could occur in 
the absence of facial expressive cues. This finding per se does not 
exclude a possible operation of involuntary facial motor mimicry when 
facial cues are present. However, it suggests an alternative mechanism 
of empathie arousal leading to facial empathie responses when facial 
cues are absent. Incompatible with the involuntary nature of facial 
81 
Chapter IV 
motor mimicry was the finding that in many instances perception of 
facial expressive cues did not lead to facial empathy. However, facial 
empathy was found to be more likely when facial expressive cues were 
present than when such cues were absent. In conclusion, facial motor 
mimicry may occur to some extent but without the involuntary nature 
which is supposed by Lipps (1926, 1935) and Hoffman (1978). The 
latter conclusion is consistent with Stotland et al.'s (1971) conceptuali-
zation of empathy in which the other person may be imitated with 
voluntary motoric responses. Based on the present study's results, we 
believe that children's facial empathie responses serve a 'read-out' 
function for the other person rather than any feedback function for the 
child himself (cf. Buck 1980). That is, by imitating the other person's 
facial expression, the child communicates his cognitive or affective 
empathy to the other person. 
There is one other result in this study that merits further comment. 
The number of cognitive empathie responses far exceeded the number 
of both the affective empathie responses and the facial empathie 
responses. An explanation might be that there was a greater range in 
individual differences in girls' ability to empathize affectively compared 
to a greater uniformity in their capacity to cognitively understand 
others' emotions, a finding which is quite common (e.g., Feshbach and 
Roe 1968; Mood et al. 1978). In addition, a number of factors might 
have contributed to this finding. First, the dissimilarity of the five-year-
old girls with the adult target-persons in the empathie arousal stimuli 
might have led to fewer identifications with the target-person which 
would reduce the chance of affective and facial empathie responses (cf. 
Shantz 1975). Second, it is sometimes doubted that in artificial experi-
mental circumstances a subject's emotion can be made to shift rapidly 
from moment to moment (Hoffman 1982). Indeed, the children in our 
study were presented with four different emotions within a few minutes. 
Considering the low incidence of affective and facial empathie re-
sponses, this rationale may also be applicable to our study. Third, the 
majority of children gave cognitive empathie responses to all four 
emotion stimuli. In contrast, anger, sadness, and fear stimuli led to 
much less affective empathie responses than did the happiness stimuli. 
The latter effect might have been partly due to children's knowledge of 
display rules. That is, five-year-olds have already learnt that it is not 
always socially appropriate to overtly verbalize (Harris et al. 1981) or 
express (Saarni 1979) negative emotions such as anger, fear, and sad-
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ness, and that such emotions can be masked by a positive emotion like 
happiness. This interpretation is supported by the observation that 
many girls in the present study gave affective and facial happy re-
sponses to stimuli of the three negative emotions. This was also found 
by Mood et al. (1978). No such systematic trend involving one of the 
other emotion responses was found. 
In conclusion, the present study has clarified an important issue 
concerning the empathie arousal process. In preschoolers, empathy is 
mediated indirectly through cognitive processes and is definitely not 
aroused directly by involuntary motor mimicry and afferent feedback. 
However, there remains the question regarding whether there are other 
mechanisms than motor mimicry and afferent feedback which can 
account for the arousal of empathy in preschoolers. Besides the in-
voluntary empathie arousal component which was considered in our 
study, Hoffman (1978) also distinguishes a voluntary arousal compo-
nent. This voluntary, more reflective arousal component is based mainly 
on the tendency to imagine oneself in the other's place, i.e., role-taking. 
According to Hoffman, the mechanism of role-taking is developmen-
tally the most advanced, and as such is believed to operate mostly in 
older children and adults. However, our conclusion with respect to 
cognitive mediation in empathy suggests that a mechanism like role-tak-
ing may already be operative in preschool children. In even younger 
children who still lack the ability to take the role of the other person, 
empathy might be aroused involuntarily by motor mimicry and afferent 
feedback. Further research is needed to answer these questions ade-
quately. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the three studies support several parts of the model 
of emotion recognition as proposed in Chapter I. First, in study 1 we 
have been able to specify correspondences between expressive distal 
cues and adult observers' cognitive understanding of expressed emo-
tions. Thereby, we have demonstrated the utility of a descriptive 
system like Ekman and Friesen's (1978) Facial Action Coding System 
(FACS) for an independent and reliable objective measurement of 
expressive distal cues. More specifically, using FACS we have shown 
that variation in emotion recognitions can be accounted for in terms 
of variation in the expressive distal cues. That is, facial expres-
sions containing distal cues unique for a particular emotion will 
result in high agreement in observers' emotion recognitions, whereas 
the involvement of facial expressive cues nonunique for a particular 
emotion is likely to result in more disagreements in observers' emo-
tion recognitions. 
It should be noted that study 1 was restricted to the actor's 
expressive distal cues and the observers' cognitive understanding of 
expressed emotions. No effort was made to assess the perceptual 
representation of the actor's expressive distal cues in the observers' 
proximal percepts. Nevertheless, the observers' proximal percepts may 
deviate from the expressive distal cues. This may be illustrated by 
the asstmed influence of the actor's physiognomic characteristics on 
emotion recognition in study 1. For example, some observers 
incorrectly recognized fear in an expression of an actor who showed 
sadness by raising and drawing together her brows. In an identical 
expression of a second actor they correctly recognized sadness. This 
discrepancy could be explained by assuming that the normally wide-open 
eyes of the first actor were misperceived as an action of upper eyelid 
raise. This facial action can be a sign of fear. In other words, the 
observers did not proximally perceive the expressive distal cues for 
85 
Chapter V 
sadness, but instead they misperceived expressive cues for fear. 
Further research in which measurement of proximal percepts is also 
included, is needed to assess in more detail the possible influence of 
the proximal percepts on emotion recognition (cf. Scherer, 1978). 
Second, in study 2 we have demonstrated that girls between Ц and θ 
years of age are able to cognitively understand an actor's emotion 
from their perception of situational and/or facial expressive distal 
cues in terms of specific emotion categories. However, this was only 
found for the emotion categories of happiness, fear, sadness, anger, 
disgust, and to a lesser extent for surprise, and not for the emotion 
categories of shame and contempt. We have interpreted girls' failure 
to recognize shame and contempt as reflecting their inability to 
integrate and interrelate the several situational events and experi­
ences underlying these complex emotions (cf. Izard, 1971, p. 326; 
Thrane, 1979). Consistent with this interpretation is our finding 
that when we asked the girls to specify the cues from which they 
inferred the emotion, most 6- and 8-year-olds indicated the situa­
tional and facial expressive distal cues for all emotions, including 
shame and contempt. In other words, girls' failure to recognize shame 
and contempt does not seem to stem from an inadequate perceptual 
representation of the distal cues, but from their inability to inter­
relate the proximal percepts in the cognitive inference process. 
Further research is needed to confirm this cognitive developmental 
basis underlying young children's inability to understand the complex 
emotions of shame and contempt. 
Third, two findings reported in study 2 support the distinction 
between a perceptual process in which distal cues are transformed to 
proximal percepts, and a cognitive inference process in which proximal 
percepts are used for cognitive understanding. A first finding con­
cerned girls' responses when asked to specify the cues they perceived 
in inferring emotions. There was a developmental trend from centration 
to decentration, i.e., from considering only one type of cue — either 
situational or expressive — to considering both types of cues. This 
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finding relates to girls' perception of situational and expressive 
cues involving the transformation of situational and expressive distal 
cues in proximal percepts. 
A second finding concerned girls' responses when asked to identify 
the emotion from discrepant situational and expressive cues. In con-
trast with the first finding, no systematic age trend in relying on 
the type of cues was fomd. Instead, girls preferred the cues depict-
ing the most recognizable emotion, regardless of the type of cues. 
That is, they relied on cues depicting a simple emotion in preference 
to cues depicting a more complex emotion, and on emotional cues in 
preference to neutral cues. This finding relates to the use of situa-
tional and expressive cues in the cognitive inference process involv-
ing the link between proximal percepts of situational and expressive 
cues and cognitive understanding. 
Most earlier studies attempting to demonstrate a developmental 
trend in children's preference for the type of cues, exclusively 
focused on the outcome of the cognitive inference process, i.e., 
children's cognitive understanding (e.g., Bums & Cavey, 1957; 
Deutsch, 1971*; Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975). Considering the two findings 
discussed above, future research in this area should also include an 
assessment of the outcome of the perceptual representation process, 
i.e., children's proximal percepts. 
It should be noted that all the findings reported in study 2 
represent findings on the group-level, unfortunately, the design of 
the study did not allow us to assess our findings on an individual 
level. Further research is needed to evaluate whether our findings not 
only reflect between-subject but also within-subject effects. 
Fourth, in study 3 we have demonstrated that most girls' emotion 
recognitions reflect cognitive understanding via a nonerapathic infer-
ence process. Only some of their emotion recognitions reflect 
empathie responses consisting of a facial expressive and/or affective 
match. Moreover, we have shown that these empathie responses are most 
likely to be the result of an inferential empathie process, i.e., 
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empathy via cognitive understanding, while very unlikely to be the 
result of a noninferential empathie process of motor mimicry and 
afferent facial feedback. Emotion recognition reflecting empathy -
either inferential or noninferential - might have been more likely 
when children would have been more actively involved in emotional 
situations, rather than having the role of uninvolved observers as in 
our experimental situations (cf. Hoffìnan, 1982). Further research is 
needed to investigate the possibility of emotion recognition reflect-
ing empathy under more real-life circumstances. 
In sum, we have clarified several parts of our model of emotion 
recognition. That is, we specified distal cues for the cognitive and 
expressive component, i.e., situational and facial expressive distal 
cues, respectively. We indirectly illustrated the utility of the dis-
tinction between distal cues in the actor and proximal percepts in the 
observa? by showing how some proximal percepts in adults may deviate 
from the facial expressive distal cues, and by demonstrating the 
impact this deviation may have on the emotion recognition response. 
We demonstrated that children's emotion recognition responses pri-
marily reflect nonempathic inferences from proximal percepts of situa-
tional and/or facial expressive cues. We found that these nonempathic 
inferences most often lead to cognitive understanding of the actor's 
emotion, but sometimes also activate inferential empathy leading to 
facial expressive and affective matches. We found no evidence for 
noninferential empathy based on children's perception of facial 
expressive distal cues. The utility of the distinction between a per-
ceptual process leading to proximal percepts and a cognitive inference 
process leading to cognitive understanding in the observer is illus-
trated by two findings. First, we argued that children's inability to 
cognitively understand the complex emotions of shame and contanpt is 
primarily caused by an inadequate cognitive inference process and not 
by an inadequate perceptual process. Second, children's cognitive 
inferences from their proximal percepts did not reflect a development 
from centration to decentration nor from egocentriam to 
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nonegocentrism, whereas their perceptual representation of distal cues 
in proximal percepts clearly reflected a development from centration 
to decentration. 
There are also parts of our model of emotion recognition that have 
yet to be examined. For example, our study was limited to the com-
ponents of emotion of which the distal cues may be directly perceived, 
i.e., the cognitive and expressive component. According to the pro-
posed model, however, the subjective and physiological components may 
also be involved in emotion recognition. The contribution of the sub-
jective component to emotion recognition may be assessed by using 
actors who verbally report their feelings (cf. Ekman & Friesen, 197*0. 
Finally, with respect to the physiological component, one may examine, 
for example, whether observers' empathie responses reflect a physio-
logical match with the actor's physiological component (cf. Hofftaan, 
1982). 
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In het huidige onderzoek wordt herkenning van emoties b i j kinderen 
en volwassenen onderzocht. Herkenning van emoties wordt gedefinieerd 
a ls het proces waardoor een persoon (de waarnaner) te weten komt hoe 
een andere persoon (de actor) zich voelt . 
In hoofdstuk I wordt het proces van emotie-herkenning besproken 
vanuit een theoretisch perspektief. In emotie-theorieën i s men het 
eens over 4 basis-komponenten van emotie, n l . een kognitieve, expres-
sieve, fysiologische en subjectieve komponent. Er wordt een theore-
tisch model voorgesteld waarin a l le 4 komponenten van de emotie van 
een actor kunnen bijdragen to t emotie-herkenning door de waarnemer. In 
di t model worden de 4 komponenten van de emotie van de actor geëxter-
naliseerd via d i s ta le cues, n l . s i tuat ionele, expressieve, fysiolo-
gische en affektieve cues. Deze dis ta le cues worden proximaal 
gerepresenteerd via perceptuele processen in proximale percepten in de 
waarnemer. Deze proximale percepten kunnen dan 3 kognitieve/affektieve 
inferentie processen aktiveren: nonempathische inferentie, inferen-
t i ë l e empathie en noninferentiële empathie. Deze processen kunnen 
tenslotte resulteren in 4 mogelijke responsen van emotie-herkenning, 
t e weten: kognitief begrijpen, en een expressieve, fysiologische, en 
affektieve match. 
Vervolgens worden er een aantal vroegere vis ies op emotie-
herkenning besproken. Aan de orde komen: het Brunswikse lens model van 
Scherer, de dimensie- en kategorieen-benadering, Flavells v i s i e , 
Borke's kognitieve empathie, Feshbachs affektieve empathie, motor 
mimicry en afferente feedback, en egocentrisme-nonegocentriane en 
centrering-decentrering. Aangetoond wordt dat al de besproken vis ies 
gerepresenteerd zijn in het voorgestelde model van emotie-herkenning. 
Twee sets van d is ta le cues worden beschoiwd als de belangrijkste bron-
nen voor emotie-herkenning, n l . s i tuationele en expressieve cues. Het 
anpirische onderzoek val t uiteen in 3 studies over de rol van s i tua-
tionele en expressieve cues in emotie-herkenning. 
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In hoofdstuk II wordt studie 1 beschreven, waarin werd getracht de 
relatie tussen gezichtsexpressieve distale cues en het kognitief 
begrijpen van uitgedrukte emoties door waarnemers nader te specifi-
ceren. Negen-en-dertig volwassen waarnemers moesten een aantal 
geposeerde gezichtsexpressies die op video waren opgenomen, beoor-
delen. Voor elk van deze gezichtsexpressies werd voorspeld in hoeverre 
het een uitdrukking was van een van de volgende 8 emoties: blijheid, 
bangheid, verdriet, boosheid, walging, verbazing, schaamte en minach-
ting. De voorspellingen waren gebaseerd op de beschrijvingen van de 
gezichtsexpressies in termen van waarneembare spierbewegingen in het 
gezicht (action units). Hiervoor werd het Facial Action Coding System 
(FACS) van Ekman en Friesen gebruikt. Uit de resultaten bleek dat de 
emotie-beoordelingen die de waarnemers gaven, overeenkwamen met de op 
FACS gebaseerde voorspellingen over action units die betrokken zijn 
bij uitdrukkingen van elk van de emoties. Bovendien bleek dat de 
waarnemers hun beoordelingen van de emotionele intensiteit bij elke 
emotie baseerden op slechts een of twee action units. 
Hoofdstuk III geeft een beschrijving van studie 2 waarin werd 
nagegaan in hoeverre kinderen van verschillende leeftijden afgaan op 
situationele en gezichtsexpressieve distale cues bij de herkenning van 
andermans emoties. De selektie van gezichtsexpressieve cues voor deze 
studie was gebaseerd op de resultaten van studie 1. Aan 96 4- tot 
8-jarige meisjes werden sketches getoond die op video waren opgenomen 
en waarin akteurs emoties uitbeeldden. Wanneer er geen discrepantie 
bestond tussen de situationele en expressieve cues, bleken de meisjes 
in elke leeftijdsgroep beter in staat de emoties blijheid, bangheid, 
verdriet, boosheid en walging te herkennen dan de emoties schaamte en 
minachting. Dit resultaat werd geïnterpreteerd als een effekt van 
verschillen in komplexiteit van emoties. Wanneer er wel discrepantie 
bestond tussen de situationele en expressieve cues, bleek er een ten-
dens te zijn om af te gaan op de cues die de meest herkenbare emotie 
uitbeeldden. D.w.z., er bestond een voorkeur voor cues die simpele 
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emoties uitbeeldden boven cues die komplexere emoties uitbeeldden, en 
een voorkeur voor cues die een emotie uitbeeldden boven cues die geen 
anotie uitbeeldden, zg. neutrale cues. In tegenstelling to t wat 
verwacht werd, bestond er geen voorkeur voor cues met een hoge sal ien-
t i e boven cuss met een lagere sa l ien t ie . Wanneer vragen gesteld wer-
den over de waargenomen cues, bleek u i t de antwoorden dat er een 
ontwikkeling plaatsvond van centrering naar decentrering. D.w.z. dat 
het afgaan op slechts een type cue afnam, en het in overweging nemen 
van beide typen cues toenam met de leef t i jd . 
In hoofdstuk IV wordt studie 3 gerapporteerd waarin werd nagegaan 
in hoeverre de emotie-herkenning op basis van si tuat ionele en ge-
zichtsexpressieve cues door kinderen opgevat kan worden a l s nonempa-
thische inferentie, inferentiële empathie, en noninferentiële 
empathie. Aan 48 5-jarige meisjes werden op video opgenomen sketches 
getoond waarin akteurs bli jheid, bangheid, verdriet of boosheid u i t -
beeldden. Voor de sketches werd een deel van de nondiscrepante cues 
ui t studie 2 gebruikt. Er werden 3 responsen van emotie-herkenning 
gemeten: kognitieve empathie (het kognitief begrijpen van de emotie 
van de actor) , affektieve empathie (reponsen die een affektieve match 
waren met de emotie van de actor) en gezichtsempathie (responsen die 
een gezichtsexpressieve match waren, gemeten met de FACS van Ekman en 
Friesen). Uit de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van de 3 empathische 
responsen kon gekonkludeerd worden dat zovrel affektieve empathie a l s 
gezichtsempathie ganedleerd werden door kognitieve empathie. Bovendien 
bleek dat kognitieve noch affektieve empathie opgewekt werd door 
onvrijwillige gezichtsempathie. Met andere woorden, de meeste 
emotie-herkenningen van de meisjes verliepen via nonempathische 
inferentie, terwijl slechts enkele emotie-herkenningen gepaard gingen 
met inferentiële empathie. Voor emotie-herkenning via noninferentiële 
empathie werd geen ondersteuning gevonden. 
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In hoofdstuk V worden de resultaten van de 3 studies besproken in 
het l i ch t van het voorgestelde model van emotie-herkenning. Ver-
scheidene onderdelen van het model blijken ondersteund te worden door 
de resultaten van de studies. Situationele en gezichtsexpressieve cues 
kunnen dienen a l s d is ta le cues voor emotie-herkenning door kinderen en 
volwassenen. Waarneming van deze cues kan via nonerapathische inferen-
t i e s leiden tot kognitief begrijpen van de emotie. Waarneming van de 
cues kan ook leiden tot een expressieve en affektieve match, maar dan 
alleen via inferentiële empathie en niet via noninferentiële empathie. 
We il lustreerden indirekt hoe de proximale percepten bi j de waarnemer 
kunnen afwijken van de expressieve d i s ta le cues van de actor, en wat 
voor een effekt d i t kan hebben op de emotie-herkenning. Bovendien werd 
aangetoond dat er in het proces van emotie-herkenning een onderscheid 
gemaakt moet worden tussen een perceptueel proces uitmondend in proxi-
male percepten en een kognitief inferentie-proces uitmondend in kogni-
t i e f begrijpen. Eiikele andere onderdelen van het model die nog 
onduidelijk blijven en verder onderzoek vereisen, betreffen de 
bijdrage to t emotie-herkenning van de fysiologische en subjektieve 
komponent. 
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Stellingen 
1. De variabiliteit In waargenomen emoties en Intensiteit van emoties 
in gezichtsexpressies kan grotendeels worden verklaard vanuit de 
waarneembare spierbewegingen in het gezicht. 
Dit proefschrift (studie 1) 
2. De bevinding dat een groot aantal kinderen al vanaf 4 Jaar in staat 
is om niet alleen situationele maar ook expressieve kenmerken te 
betrekken bij hun beoordeling van andermans emoties, is in tegen-
spraak met hetgeen vaak verondersteld wordt op grond van het 
egocentrisme-begrip van Piaget. 
Dit proefschrift (studie 2) 
3. Hoffman's (1978) veronderstelling dat empathie opgewekt wordt via 
een onvrijwillige motorische mimicry respons, wordt niet gesteund. 
Ho f finan, M.L. (1978). Touard a theory of empathie arousal and 
development. In M. Lewis & L.A. Rosenblum (Eds.), The develop-
ment of affect. New ïork: Plenum Press, pp. 227-256. 
Dit proefschrift (studie 3) 
4. Recent onderzoek waarin bewijs werd gevonden voor emotie-specifieke 
aktiviteit in het autonome zenuwstelsel (Ekman et al., 1983), toont 
aan dat kognitieve theorieën van emotie die uitgaan van een onge-
differentieerde autonome arousal, niet langer houdbaar zijn. 
Ekman, P., Levenson, R.W., i Friesen, U.V. (1983). Autonomie 
nervous system activity distinguishes among emotions. Science, 
221, 1208-1210. 
5. Een van de belangrijkste determinanten van emotioneel labiel gedrag 
van het kind op schoolleeftijd wordt gevormd door een lage en/of 
inkonsistente responsiviteit van de primaire opvoeder op de sig-
nalen van het kind op baby-leeftijd. 
6. De tendens tot 'vertrossing' in het Nederlandse Omroep Bestel komt 
niet zozeer tot uitdrukking in een toename van amusementsprogramma's 
en een afname van informatieve programma's (van Niekerk, 1983) als 
wel in een toename van zowel amusements- als informatieve pro-
gramma's met een verstrooiende, afgevlakte inhoud. 
Niekerk, P. van (1983). Vertrossing: hoezo? Inteimediair, 19(41), 
1-5. 
7. Het imago van sociaal-wetenschappelijke publikaties zou enigszins 
kunnen worden opgevijzeld indien onderzoekers statistisch signifi-
kant minder vaak gelijk zouden stellen met theoretisch van belang. 
8. De uit de voorwaardelijke financieringsproblematiek sprekende ten-
dens tot reduktie van het universitaire werk tot onderzoek getuigt 
van een onderschatting van de onderwijsfunktie van de universiteiten. 
9. Bij de weging van onderzoek door middel van citaten-analyse dient 
niet alleen afgegaan te worden op de frekwentie van citaten maar ook 
op het gewicht en de richting van de citaten. 
10. Het gegeven dat zowel aan Amerikaanse als aan Russische zijde nu al 
voldoende kernwapen-potentieel aanwezig is om de gehele wereld-
bevolking vele malen uit te roeien, maakt iedere vorm van verdere 
kernwapenwedloop volstrekt overbodig. 
11. De kwaliteit van de kommentaren van de buitenland-korrespondenten 
van het NOS-Journaal is omgekeerd evenredig met de frekwentie en 
intensiteit van het optrekken en fronsen hunner wenkbrauwen. 
12. Gezien de energie-schaarste verdient het aanbeveling de ja-knikkers 
in de Staten-Generaal aan te wenden voor aardolie-winning. 
Nijmegen, 9 fébruwri. 1984 Mobiel Niggers 


